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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the legal compatibility of the establishment of an EU 
Terrorist Finance Tracking System with EU primary law.  
Currently, financial intelligence capacities for counter-terrorism purposes are 
outsourced to the United States which run a Terrorist Finance Tracking Program 
in order to detect ‘terrorist monies’ in international bank transfers. Known as the 
SWIFT II Agreement, this cooperation has been praised as a valuable tool for the 
EU’s security and condemned for its fundamental rights intrusiveness. The thesis 
identifies the deficiencies of the United States’ practice as opposed to the black 
letter words of the Agreement. Analysing the latest EU case law on the rights to 
privacy and data protection, SWIFT II is scrutinised against the criteria set out by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. It is argued that the transatlantic 
cooperation fails to meet the high standards stipulated by the Court in various 
ways.  
From the entry into force of the Agreement, the set-up of a European system was 
considered as a desirable alternative in order to restore fundamental rights 
compliance. Whilst the idea was dismissed in 2013 due to its cost-intensity and 
impact on EU fundamental rights, it has been reanimated in light of the numerous 
terrorist atrocities on European soil during the last three years. However, the EU 
Commission is now heading for a complementary scheme to SWIFT II. It is 
submitted that a European equivalent to the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program 
can be modelled in conformity with the Court’s understanding of individual privacy 
and data protection. However, assuming that Europol was to be tasked with its 
operation, the thesis supports a restrictive interpretation of EU competence in 
matters of police cooperation and doubts that the EU could rely on the ordinary 
legislative procedure to do so. 
Nevertheless, it is concluded that SWIFT II is practically immune to EU legal 
scrutiny and will perpetuate violating the rights enshrined in primary law unless 
renegotiated with regard to the criteria established in EU case law. 
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 INTRODUCTION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
SWIFT (the Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications)1 is the 
financial world’s major ‘post service’ with nearly 30 million transactions channelled 
through its network per day.2 Among those, in all probability, are terrorist monies 
spent on recruitment, training and equipment for future suicide attackers and 
foreign fighters. It is the mission of the EU – U.S. cooperation under the so-called 
SWIFT II Agreement3 to identify and drain money flows of terrorist groups and their 
supporters by analysing suspicious SWIFT messages.  
 
The agreement has encountered opposition from the outset for different reasons; 
primarily, bulk data transfers to U.S. territory have been disputed for their 
compatibility with European Human Rights standards on privacy and data 
protection. On the other hand, political stakeholders have argued that the U.S.-led 
analysis of financial data was a critical tool for the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy 
to succeed.4 The set-up of a European-led Terrorist Finance Tracking scheme has 
been mutually understood as a desirable alternative to SWIFT II. After the EU 
Commission submitted a feasibility study in 2013 which recommended not to pursue 
the project of a European programme in substitution of SWIFT II,5 the idea has been 
reanimated in the 2016 Action Plan on strengthening the fight against terrorism 
financing.6  It is this thesis’ purpose to discuss the legality of the current agreement 
and assess a favourable option for a future SWIFT III. 
 
I. Subject matter and methodology 
Although the adoption and coming into force of SWIFT I and II caught the attention 
of politicians, media and scholars,7 the agreement’s long-term implementation and 
                                                          
1 A cooperative society under Belgian law with headquarter in La Hulpe, SWIFT facilitates 
trans-border transactions and thus provides a critical infrastructure of the international 
finance industry. 
2 SWIFT, <https://www.swift.com/about-us/highlights-2017> accessed 16 April 2018. 
3 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United 
States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (adopted 13 July 2010; 
entered into force 01 August 2010) [2010] OJ L195/5. 
4 For this and the previous see: EP Plenary Verbatim Record (10 February 2010) 
P7_CRE(2010)02-10, 158ff. 
5 Commission, A European terrorist finance tracking system (EU TFTS), COM(2013) 842 
final, 34. 
6 Commission, Communication on an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against 
terrorist financing, COM(2016) 50 final. 
7 E.g.: Letter from Jacob Kohnstamm (Art. 29 Working Party) and Francesco Pizzetti 
(Working Party on Police and Justice) to Juan Fernando Lopez Aguilar (LIBE Committee) 
10 
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operation has been followed less closely.8 Against the background of growing case-
law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on privacy and data 
protection from 2014 on,9 this is somewhat surprising. As opposed to the analysis 
and transfer of Passenger Name Records which finally became subject of a legal 
opinion delivered by the Court in 2017,10 SWIFT II has rarely been cross-checked 
with the newly established criteria set forth in Luxembourg case-law.11 
 
An exception is the work of Mara Wesseling who, pursuing a socio-legal approach, 
continuously analysed the political developments in the ‘SWIFT affair’ from 2010 
on.12 In her latest publication on An EU Terrorist Finance Tracking System (EU TFTS), 
Wesseling raises legal questions concerning an EU scheme’s concurrence with EU 
fundamental rights.13 The present thesis builds on these questions assessing the 
compliance of SWIFT II and a potential SWIFT III scheme with the privacy and data 
protection standards stipulated by the CJEU. Beyond the problem of human rights 
compliance, the study challenges the tacit, albeit general assumption of EU 
competence in this matter, in order to determine if a system comparable to the 
U.S. programme could be established at EU level at all. 
 
                                                          
(25 June 2010); Valentina Pop ‘MEP: Swift “secrecy” may hamper new data deals with US’ 
(euobserver, 28 February 2011) <https://euobserver.com/institutional/31880> accessed 17 
April 2018; Sylvia Kierkegaard, ‘US war on terror EU SWIFT(ly) signs blank cheque on EU 
data’ (2011) 27 Computer Law & Security R, 449ff. 
8 Apart from periodic Joint Reviews conducted by the Contracting Parties according to 
art.13 SWIFT II (see nos.48, 51, 54).  
9 In particular: Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Others v 
Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238; Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige and Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v Post- och telestyrelsen and Others [2016] 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:970; Case C-362/14 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2015] 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.  
10 Opinion 1/15 EU-Canada PNR-Agreement [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2016:656. 
11 In fact, only three publications apply the Court’s rulings of 2014 until 2016 to SWIFT II:  
Franziska Boehm and Mark D. Cole, ‘Data Retention after the Judgement of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union’ (2014), 72ff., arguing that SWIFT II is in breach of EU 
fundamental rights; alike: Carolin Möller, The Evolution of Data Protection and Privacy in 
the Public Security Context – An Institutional Analysis of Three EU Data Retention and 
Access Regimes (PhD thesis, 2017), 175ff.; dissenting: Will R. Mbioh, ‘The TFTP 
Agreement, Schrems Rights, and the Saugmandsgaard Requirements’ (2016) 20 J Internet L 
29ff. 
12 with Marieke de Goede and Louise Amoore, ‘Data Wars Beyond Surveillance: Opening the 
black box of Swift’ (2012) 5 J Cultural Economy 49; The European Fight against Terrorism 
Financing, Professional Fields and New Governing Practices (Boxpress 2013); ‘Evaluation of 
EU measures to combat terrorist financing’ (In-depth Analysis for LIBE, 2014); ‘An EU 
Terrorist Finance Tracking System’ (Occasional Paper, RUSI September 2016). 
13 Ibid (2016), 23f. 
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The analysis is based on primary sources, namely the EU treaties and the text of the 
current agreement, along with CJEU documents, EU policy documents, scholarly 
publications and other secondary sources. The overall approach remains dogmatic; 
nevertheless, it displays some hybrid features with law in context research as much 
as EU law allows for extended modes of legal exposition.14 Moreover, analysing the 
agreement’s implementation in reality and comparing practice with the black letter 
provisions, the thesis’ aim is also to contribute to law reform regarding a future EU-
led programme. 
 
II. Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 1 summarises the development of the EU-U.S. cooperation on SWIFT data 
so far, putting it into the context of transatlantic data transfers for law enforcement 
and counter-terrorism purposes in general. Additionally, inter alia building on the 
findings of Wesseling, data processing under the current agreement is explained in 
detail. In chapter 2, the stages of data processing identified in the previous chapter 
are scrutinised against the standard of privacy and data protection enshrined in the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) as interpreted by the CJEU. 
Consequently, chapter 3 drafts a model of an EU TFTS coherent with the 
requirements outlined in chapter 2. Finally, chapter 4 answers the question if the 
EU could establish a programme as described in chapter 3 as an ordinary matter of 
shared competence in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. In some 
concluding remarks, the main options for further action are presented.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 The methodological pluralism (inter alia) coming with Europeanisation of legal-dogmatic 
research is described in: Jan Vranken, ‘Exiting Times for Legal Scholarship’ (2012) 2 Recht 
en Methode in onderzoek en onderwijs 42, 50f., 55ff. 
12 
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B. Chapter 1: Background and operation of SWIFT II 
This chapter provides factual information about the development of the EU-U.S. 
SWIFT cooperation and its implementation in practice today. Whilst the first section 
mainly focusses on the period preceding the signature of SWIFT II in 2010, the 
second section reconstructs its functioning on the basis of Joint Review Reports 
submitted by the EU Commission in accordance with the provisions of the agreement 
from 2011 on. It will be shown that the U.S. programme underwent a remarkable 
evolution from a clandestine, unilateral intelligence scheme to a transatlantic 
partnership. Furthermore, it is explained why critics coined it ‘a fishing expedition’ 
whereas supporters praised the programme as ‘a sharp harpoon’ in the fight against 
terrorism.15  
 
I. From unilateral intelligence gathering to SWIFT II: a chronology 
 
1. Revelation of the TFTP 
In June 2006, several American newspapers revealed the existence of a secret 
intelligence unit of the U.S. Treasury (UST) tasked to analyse international money 
transfers in order to identify sources of terrorist financing and hitherto unknown 
associates of terrorist organisations.16 For purposes of a Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Program (TFTP), the UST had subpoenaed massive amounts of financial messaging 
data from the U.S. SWIFT operations centre by way of monthly issued production 
orders without any court approval;17 from 2002 on, TFTP investigators practically 
had access to the company’s entire database, including data of European account 
holders.18  
 
                                                          
15 Barton Gellman et al, ‘Bank Records Secretly Tapped’ (The Washington Post, 23 June 
2006), citing UST Undersecretary Stuart Levey. 
16 Ibid; Josh Meyer and Greg Miller, ‘U.S. Secretly Tracks Global Bank Data’ (LA Times, 23 
June 2006) <http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jun/23/nation/na-swift23>; Eric Lichtblau 
and James Risen, ‘Bank Data Is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block Terror’ (The NY Times, 23 
June 2017) <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/washington/23intel.html?emc=eta1>; 
both accessed 06 March 2017. 
17 Invoking Presidential E.O. 13224 of 23 September 2001 on Blocking Property and 
Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support 
Terrorism 66 FR 49079, in particular art.7 thereof.  
18 Cf. Lichtblau/Risen, supra no.16, citing a person familiar with the operation as saying: 
‘At first, they got everything — the entire Swift database’; according to the Belgian Data 
Protection Commission, Opinion No. 37/2006 of 27 September 2006 on the Transfer of 
Personal Data by the CSLR SWIFT by Virtue of UST (OFAC) Subpoenas (inofficial translation 
into English) (2006), 5,  SWIFT had refused any cooperation with U.S. intelligence agencies 
before 9/11, but subsequently did not seek judicial redress against the broad 
administrative subpoenas under the TFTP. 
13 
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The reaction on behalf of the European Community and its Member States was 
vehement and dismissive;19 European data protection watchdogs and 
Parliamentarians called for an immediate termination of the programme and 
insisted that the U.S. comply with Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) mechanisms in 
order to acquire European personal data.20 An EU-U.S. MLA Agreement had been 
negotiated and signed in 2003, with a specific provision on bank information.21 As 
to other data transfers for law enforcement purposes, namely of Passenger Name 
Records (PNR), a specific agreement had already been found22 and was to be 
renewed.23 Against this background, the entirely covert operation of the TFTP could 
be interpreted only as an intentional circumvention of European data protection 
and privacy safeguards.24  
 
In order to put the ongoing bulk transfer of SWIFT data on an official basis, the UST 
submitted unilateral ‘Representations’ in July 2007,25 basically comprising the 
TFTP’s data protection standards (negotiated with SWIFT as early as 200326).  
                                                          
19 Cf. Hans-Jürgen Schlamp, ‘EU to Allow US Access to Bank Transaction Data’ (spiegel 
online, 27 November 2009) <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/spying-on-
terrorist-cash-flows-eu-to-allow-us-access-to-bank-transaction-data-a-663846.html> 
accessed 02 May 2018.  
20 EP, Resolution on the interception of bank transfer data from the SWIFT system by the 
US secret services (P6_TA(2006)0317) [2006] OJ CE303/843; Article 29 Working Party, 
Opinion 10/2006 on the processing of personal data by the Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) (WP128); EDPS, Opinion on the role of the European 
Central Bank in the SWIFT case [2007] 
<https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/07-02-
01_opinion_ecb_role_swift_en.pdf> accessed 06 March 2017. 
21 Agreement on mutual legal assistance between the European Union and the United 
States of America (EU-US) (adopted 25 June 2003, entered into force 01 January 2010) 
[2003] OJ L181/34. 
22 Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the 
Processing and Transfer of PNR Data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of 
Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (EU-US) (adopted 28 May 
2004; out of force since 30 September 2006) [2004] OJ L183/84. 
23 Due to a lack of Community competence: ECJ, Joined cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 
European Parliament v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities [2006] ECR I-04721; after an Interim Agreement came into force at the end 
of 2006, a second PNR-Agreement was negotiated in 2007: Agreement between the 
European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) [2007] OJ L204, 16. 
24 However, U.S. parliamentary oversight bodies were not fully put on notice of the 
programme; UST officials explained the high demand for secrecy essential for the TFTP’s 
operability: The Terror Finance Tracking Program: Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Financing Services, 119 Cong. 2nd Sess. 
(2006), Serial No.109-125 (in particular Statement of Stuart Levey). 
25 United States, Processing of EU originating Data by United States Department for 
Counter Terrorism Purposes - SWIFT - Terrorist Finance Tracking Program - 
Representations of the United States Department of the Treasury [2007] OJ C166/18. 
26 Cf. Belgian Data Protection Commission, supra no.18, 6f. 
14 
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A major concession of the U.S. government was the nomination of an ‘eminent 
European person’ mandated to oversee the TFTP’s compliance with the 
Representations. Appointed to this post in 2008, French judge and counter-terrorism 
expert Jean Louis Bruguière came to the conclusion that the TFTP ran in conformity 
with the safeguards and guarantees, outlining its great value in the fight against 
terrorism.27 
 
2. SWIFT I and II 
In an attempt to comply with both the U.S. subpoenas and European data protection 
regulations,28 SWIFT adhered to the Safe Harbour principles in 2007.29 At this point, 
SWIFT had already decided to rearrange its security structure by the end of 200930 
and from then on to process its data separately in an European and a transatlantic 
zone, thus keeping EU financial data as well as SWIFT messages from Pakistan, Iraq 
and Sudan out of reach of UST production orders.31 Since the company’s re-
architecture coincided with the EU Treaty reform, the EU Council and Commission 
were determined to finalize an arrangement with the U.S. on the processing of 
European SWIFT data before the European Parliament would gain the right of 
                                                          
27 The reports were classified but leaked: Jean Louis Bruguière, Summary of the First 
Annual Report on the Processing of EU Originating Personal Data by the United States 
Treasury Department for Counter-Terrorism Purposes [2008] 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/apr/eu-usa-tftp-swift-1st-report-2008-judge-
bruguiere.pdf>; Second Report on the Processing of EU-Originating Personal Data by the 
United States Treasury Department for Counter Terrorsim Purposes [2010] 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2010/aug/eu-usa-swift-2nd-bruguiere-report.pdf>; 
both accessed 02 May 2018.  
28 The collision of obligations in the SWIFT case is described in detail in: Patrick M. 
Connorton, ‘Tracking Terrorist Financing Through SWIFT: When U.S. Subpoenas and 
Foreign Privacy Law Collide’ (2007) 76 Fordham LR 283ff; however, the Belgian Data 
Protection Commission eventually released SWIFT from the allegation of having violated 
Belgian (and EU) data protection law: Decision of 9 December 2008 (free translation) 
<https://www.privacycommission.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/swift_dec
ision_en_09_12_2008.pdf> accessed 19 April 2018. 
29 SWIFT, ‘SWIFT completes transparency improvements and obtains registration for Safe 
Harbor’ <https://www.swift.com/about-us/swift-and-data> accessed 04 April 2017; 
Commission, Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe 
harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce (2000/520/EC) [2000] OJ L215/7. 
30 SWIFT, ‘SWIFT announces plans for system re-architecture’ 
<https://www.swift.com/insights/press-releases/swift-announces-plans-for-system-re-
architecture> accessed 04 April 2017; the EP had called the company to do so: Resolution 
on SWIFT, the PNR agreement and the transatlantic dialogue on these issues 
(P6_TA(2007)0039) [2007] OJ CE287/349. 
31 The installation of a common back-up centre in Switzerland made mirroring of European 
data to the American operations centre unnecessary: Ariadna Ripoll Servent and Alex 
MacKenzie, ‘Is the EP Still a Data Protection Champion? The Case of SWIFT’ (2011) 12 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society 390, 394. 
15 
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approval. An interim agreement was adopted on 30 November 2009,32 just one day 
ahead of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
In comparison to the 2007 Representations, SWIFT I established a formalized 
procedure for U.S. data requests to be verified by governments of Belgium and the 
Netherlands where SWIFT’s European headquarters and operations centre are 
located (art.4). Furthermore, the agreement established reciprocity and joined EU-
U.S. review mechanisms (arts.8-10). However, SWIFT I failed to ban bulk data 
transfers to U.S. territory, or to provide individual rights to access or rectification, 
or independent oversight, or enhanced limitations to dissemination.33 The EU 
Parliament rebuked the Council and Commission for their strategy and the flaws of 
the agreement.34 In February 2010, due to a shift of legal opinion on the 
Parliament’s right to participation,35 the plenary took the chance to reject SWIFT I 
with the result that data transfers to the UST were blocked from then on.36 
Since the failure to implement the interim agreement was perceived to have 
resulted in a severe security gap,37 the EU urgently re-entered into negotiations 
with the U.S. on a long-term compromise. Hence the parties did not wait for the 
conclusion of a framework agreement on EU-U.S. data transfers for law enforcement 
                                                          
32 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United 
States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (EU-US) (adopted 30 
November 2009) [2010] OJ L8/11. 
33 EDPS, Comments on different international agreements, notably the EU-US and EU-AUS 
PNR agreements, the EU-US-TFTP agreement, and the need of a comprehensive approach 
to international data exchange agreements of 25 January 2010 
<https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/10-01-
25_eu_us_data_exchange_en.pdf> accessed 02 May 2018. 
34 EP, Resolution of 17 September 2009 on the envisaged international agreement to make 
available to the United States Treasury Department financial payment messaging data to 
prevent and combat terrorism and terrorist financing (P7_TA(2009)0016) [2010] OJ 
CE224/8. 
35 The legal services of the Council and Commission had issued a legal opinion on the 
matter, from: Jens Ambrock, Die Übermittlung von SWIFT-Daten an die 
Terrorismusaufklärung der USA (Duncker & Humblot 2013), 40. 
36 EP, Legislative Resolution of 11 February 2010 on the proposal for a Council decision on 
the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of 
America on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European 
Union to the United States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program 
(P7_TA(2010)0029) [2010] OJ C341E/100. 
37  See Remarks by Joseph Biden: EP Formal Sitting Verbatim Record (06 May 2010) 
P7_CRE(2010)OT-06, 41. 
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purposes38 and adopted SWIFT II in July 2010.39 SWIFT II addressed the Parliament’s 
request for the exclusion of SEPA-data (art.4 para.2 lit.d), a narrower definition of 
terrorism (art.2) and the inclusion of expressly enumerated rights to access, 
rectification and redress (arts.14ff).40 Nevertheless, no judicial oversight was 
established. As opposed to SWIFT I, Europol has been tasked with pre-approving the 
subpoenas (art.4 paras.3-5); additionally, monitoring the UST’s processing practices 
has been mandated to a permanent European on-site overseer (art.12). Albeit 
concerns persisted as to the effectiveness of the individual rights stipulated under 
the agreement and its proportionality in general,41 the Parliament approved the 
text, 42 but insisted that the Commission assess alternative options to bulk transfers 
under SWIFT II.43 
 
3. Implementation 
After SWIFT II had entered into force on 1 August 2010, parliamentary control of its 
implementation proved difficult on grounds of restricted access to information, 
including the identity of the EU on-site overseer and the reports on Europol’s 
approval practice submitted by the Europol Joint Supervisory Body (JSB).44 
                                                          
38 Negotiations on an ‘Umbrella Agreement’ started in May 2010: Commission, ‘European 
Commission seeks high privacy standards in EU-US data protection agreement’ 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-609_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 06 April 
2017. 
39 Council, Decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and 
the United States of America on the processing and transfer of financial messaging data 
from the European Union to the United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance 
Tracking Program [2010] OJ L195/3.  
40 LIBE, Recommendation on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement 
between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and 
transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (P7_A(2010)0224), 7f. 
41 EDPS, Opinion on the proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Agreement 
between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and 
transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP II) [2010] OJ C355/10; Letter to 
LIBE, supra no.7. 
42 EP, Legislative Resolution of 8 July 2010 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion 
of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United 
States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (P7_TA(2010)0279) 
[2010] OJ CE351/453. 
43 EP, Resolution of 5 May 2010 on the Recommendation from the Commission to the 
Council to authorise the opening of negotiations for an agreement between the European 
Union and the United States of America to make available to the United States Treasury 
Department financial messaging data to prevent and combat terrorism and terrorist 
financing (P7_TA(2010)0143) [2010] OJ CE81/66. 
44 Pop, supra no.7; the complaint filed against the restriction of the report with the 
European Ombudsman was finally not decided upon, as the Ombudsman himself was not 
granted access to the documents due to the resistance of the UST: Decision of the 
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Moreover, the review mechanisms in place turned out to be dysfunctional. Whilst 
the JSB (in an official summary) concluded that all U.S. data request so far issued 
under SWIFT II were so broad and unclear in scope that it had been impossible for 
Europol to verify their compliance with the requirements set out in the agreement,45 
a Joint Review conducted according to art.12 found that Europol had exercised 
oversight sufficiently.46 Remarkably, Europol had not rejected a single U.S. request. 
Neither did consecutive reports by the JSB47 and the Joint Review group48 enhance 
transparency; in particular, the total amount of data transferred to the UST remains 
secret until today.49 
 
When Edward Snowden accused the NSA inter alia of having circumvented SWIFT II 
by backdoor-accessing SWIFT’s networks, the Parliament called for the agreement’s 
suspension in October 2013.50 However, an investigation could not confirm the 
allegations51 and the Council and Commission refrained from terminating or 
                                                          
European Ombudsman closing the inquiry into complaint 1148/2013/TN against the 
European Police Office (Europol) of 02 September 2014 
<https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/de/cases/decision.faces/de/54678/html.bookmark
> accessed 06 April 2017. 
45 JSB, Report on the Inspection of Europol's Implementation of the TFTP Agreement, 
conducted in November 2010 
<http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/20170706142918/http://europoljsb.europa.
eu/media/111009/terrorist%20finance%20tracking%20program%20(tftp)%20inspection%20re
port%20-%20public%20version.pdf> accessed 02 May 2018. 
46 Commission, Report on the joint review of the implementation of the Agreement 
between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and 
transfer of Financial Messaging data from the European Union to the United States for the 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program 17-18 February 2011 (Commission Staff 
Working Paper) SEC(2011) 438 final; eventually, a member of the European Joint Review 
team dissociated himself from the thoroughly positive wording of the report: Letter from 
Paul Breitbarth to Reinhard Priebe (14 April 2011) accessed 06 April 2017. 
47 Especially questioning the practice of bulk transfers and the lack of transparency: JSB, 
Europol JSB Inspects for the Second Year the Implementation of the TFTP Agreement 
<http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/20170706142918/http://europoljsb.europa.
eu/media/205081/tftp%20public%20statement%20-%20final%20-%20march%202012.pdf> 
accessed 02 May 2018. 
48 Commission, Report on the second joint review of the implementation of the Agreement 
between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and 
transfer of Financial Messaging data from the European Union to the United States for the 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program October 2012 (Commission Staff 
Working Document) SWD(2012) 454 final. 
49 Ibid, 15, the UST only indicates the trend of increase or decrease of data transferred; 
generally as to secrecy in the implementation of SWIFT II: Marieke de Goede and Mara 
Wesseling, ‘Secrecy and security in transatlantic terrorism finance tracking’ (2017) 39 J 
European Integration 253, 260ff. 
50 EP, Resolution of 23 October 2013 on the suspension of the TFTP agreement as a result 
of US National Security Agency surveillance (2013/2831(RSP)) [2016] OJ C208/153. 
51 Commission, Joint Review Report of the implementation of the Agreement between the 
European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of 
Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the purposes of 
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suspending the agreement on grounds of U.S. misconduct. On the contrary, the 
importance of the ongoing cooperation by virtue of SWIFT II was reiterated at the 
end of November 2013, when the Commission issued a report on a joint evaluation 
of the TFTP’s value under art.6 para.6 of the agreement52 and, in parallel, a 
feasibility study on the establishment of an EU TFTS.53 Whilst substituting SWIFT II 
with a European-led scheme was assessed as conflicting with EU Fundamental Rights 
and coming at a considerable expenditure, the results yielded from TFTP analyses 
were regarded as essential in the fight against international terrorism. Against the 
background of numerous terrorist incidents, among them the attack on Charlie 
Hebdo in January 2015, the latest Joint Review report of January 2017 upheld the 
conclusion that SWIFT II remained of outstanding value to the EU’s counter-
terrorism strategy.54 
 
4. Exiting times for data protection 
As opposed to SWIFT II’s remarkable persistence, other EU instruments of data 
collection and transfer have sustained damage in the course of the NSA affair. The 
CJEU annulled the General Data Retention Directive in 2014 as well as the Safe 
Harbour scheme for commercial data transfers to the U.S. in 2015,55 thereby putting 
into question draft PNR Agreements and the draft EU-U.S. Umbrella Agreement. 
Whilst Safe Harbour was replaced by the so-called Privacy Shield56 and the Umbrella 
                                                          
the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (Commission Staff Working Document) SWD(2014) 
264 final, 19ff. 
52 Commission, Joint Report from the Commission and the U.S. Treasury Department 
regarding the value of TFTP Provided Data pursuant to Article 6 (6) of the Agreement 
between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and 
transfer of Financial Messanging Data from the European Union to the United States for the 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, Annex to COM(2013) 843 final. 
53 Commission, A European terrorist finance tracking system (EU TFTS) COM(2013) 842 
final. 
54 Commission, Joint Review Report of the implementation of the Agreement between the 
European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of 
Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the purposes of 
the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2017) 17 
final.  
55 DRI and Schrems, supra no.9. 
56 Commission, Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the 
protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield [2016] OJ L207/1; the adequacy decision 
based on Privacy Shield was challenged before the General Court which rejected the 
application as being inadmissible: Case T-670/16 Digital Rights Ireland v. Commission 
(2017) ECLI:EU:T:2017:838. 
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Agreement eventually entered into force in February 2017,57 the adoption of a PNR-
Agreement with Canada was stopped by the Court in summer 2017.58  
 
In the meantime, the EU reformed its entire legislative framework on data 
protection, passing a Data Protection Regulation, a Directive on Data Processing for 
Law Enforcement Purposes, an EU PNR Directive59 and a new Europol-Regulation in 
2016.60 It comes as no surprise that data processing under SWIFT II deviates from 
those newly established provisions in various ways. The next section will explain the 
regulatory framework of the agreement and its operation in practice. 
 
II. How it works: SWIFT II 
It has never been disclosed how financial data is processed in the course of SWIFT 
II. On the basis of the agreement’s wording, official reports issued by oversight and 
review bodies, statements on behalf of Europol and the UST as well as various 
newspaper articles, the following paragraphs reconstruct the scheme’s functioning 
in as much detail as possible. The TFTP’s database (‘black box’)61 and the methods 
applied to analyse the data stored therein form the heart of the entire process. 
Here, the analysis primarily builds on Wesseling’s findings on the TFTP’s logic and 
technology in order to shed light on the intelligence production by the UST. It will 
be shown that the provisions leave considerable discretion to the mandated 
agencies, and that the practice of their application might even contravene SWIFT 
II’s wording and purpose. Before turning to the various stages of data processing 
                                                          
57 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the 
protection of personal information relating to the prevention, investigation, detection, 
and prosecution of criminal offences (adopted 02 June 2016, entered into force 01 
February 2017) [2016] OJ L336/3. 
58 PNR Canada, supra no.10. 
59 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC; Directive (EU) 
2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities 
for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, 
and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA; Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of passenger name 
record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime; all published in [2016] OJ L119/1ff, 89ff, 132ff. 
60 Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 
on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing 
and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 
2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA [2016] OJ L135/53. 
61 The notion is taken from Wesseling et al, supra no.12, and from the Belgian Data 
Protection Commission, supra no.18, 5. 
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under the agreement, however, it shall be explained how SWIFT’s messaging service 
works and why it is the most intelligible data source for the TFTP’s purposes. 
 
1. SWIFT FIN messages 
As its official title reveals, SWIFT II regulates the transfer of financial messaging 
data; according to its Annexe, SWIFT is the solitary provider data is taken from. 
More precisely, it is SWIFT’s core service FIN enabling the trans-border exchange of 
messages formatted in traditional SWIFT standard.62  
 
In 2017, 7.1 billion FIN messages were sent through SWIFT’s network63 which is built 
in a V-structure of national concentrators (functioning as a letter box) and 
operations centres (comparable to postmen).64  The sending bank generates a 
standardised SWIFT message comprising: an envelope (‘header’) inter alia 
containing the address of the sending and recipient bank and respective bank 
account numbers, the message type (e.g. customer fund transfer) and an 
authentication code; a letter (‘body’) with the main instructions for the transaction 
(amount of money, currency, value date, reference); a trailer which signals the end 
of the message.65 In SWIFT’s national concentration centre, the letter is encrypted 
and the message is deconstructed to packages. Sent to one of SWIFT’s operations 
centres, the data packages are forwarded to the national concentrator allocated to 
the receiving bank as soon as the receiving bank signals receptivity. This national 
concentrator pieces the message together and approves its correctness, checking 
the authentication code of the envelope. The receiving bank decrypts the message 
and the same information is sent back through the network to the originator’s bank. 
The receiving bank credits the designated amount to the beneficiary’s account 
whereas the sending bank discounts the originator’s account respectively. Through 
common settlement accounts, the involved banks finalise the transaction 
afterwards.66 For purposes of claims management, the messages are mirrored to 
SWIFT’s back-up centre in Switzerland where the copies are stored for 124 days.67 
This is the database of interest for the TFTP. 
                                                          
62 Belgian Data Protection Commission, ibid. 
63 SWIFT, supra no.1. 
64 Susan V. Scott and Markos Zachariadis, The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (SWIFT). Cooperative governance for network innovation, standards, 
and community (Routledge 2014), 36. 
65 Ibid, 62ff.; other message types are, inter alia, travellers checks or precious metals and 
syndications. 
66 For this and the previous sentences: Ambrock, supra no.35, 23ff, 127ff. 
67 Ibid, 20ff. 
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2. The qualities of SWIFT data 
From the perspective of intelligence and law enforcement agencies, SWIFT 
messages possess most convenient properties.68  Firstly, FIN provides a large-scale 
database containing data on a variety of transactions between a variety of actors 
around the globe, most of which are communications data (names of sender and 
recipient, local branch of sender’s bank, date and time of generation of message), 
giving away a lot of information on the persons involved in the transaction, for 
example their location at a specific moment in time.69 Although the UST asserts that 
SWIFT data rarely contains sensitive information (as on sexual orientation, religious 
or political conviction etc., art.5 para.7), it is still possible to draw detailed 
conclusions on a person’s private life from the messages, in particular from their 
reference which is also accessible to the investigators. Moreover, SWIFT data 
provides additional identification details of utmost relevance for counter-terrorism 
purposes, such as addresses, phone numbers or national ID-numbers (cf. art.5 
para.7).70   
 
Secondly, data processed through SWIFT’s network are highly accurate and 
reliable,71 for the obvious reason of the contractors’ mutual interest in a smooth 
and successful transaction and reduction of unnecessary costs. Thirdly, FIN 
messages are standardised, reducing the effort of preliminary data cleansing which 
makes SWIFT data most valuable for automated data analysis.72 
 
3. UST data requests 
In order to receive data from SWIFT, the UST issues formal production orders 
(administrative subpoenas) to SWIFT. According to art.4 paras.1 and 2, those 
subpoenas must be tailored as narrowly as possible, that is to say that they have (1) 
to identify the requested data as clearly as possible, inter alia by naming specific 
                                                          
68 Generally, see Statement of Stuart Levey, supra no.24, 13. 
69 Cf. Anthony Amicelle, ‘The Great (Data) Bank Robbery: Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Program and the "SWIFT Affair"’ (Centre d'études et de recherches internationales Sciences 
Po 2011), 10. 
70 Gellman et al, supra no.15, quoting Stuart Levey: ‘The way the SWIFT data works, you 
would have all kinds of concrete information - addresses, phone numbers, real names, 
account numbers, […] the kind of actionable information that government officials can 
really follow up on’. 
71 Scott/Zachariadis, supra no.64, 65. 
72 For this and the previous, cf. Mary DeRosa, ‘Data Mining and Data Analysis for 
Counterterrorism’ (CSIS 2004) 3, 9. 
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data categories; (2) to clearly substantiate the necessity of the data for the purpose 
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of terrorism or terrorist 
financing; (3) to narrow down the scope of the request as far as possible by collating 
it with analyses of former requests and their investigative value for past and current 
terrorism operations, with suspected terrorist activities and with further situation 
analyses;73 (4) to exclude SEPA-data.  
 
According to Europol, the requests ‘exhibit a certain level of abstraction.’74 In 
practice, the production orders are issued for an average period of four weeks, 
comprise a list of targeted countries and denominate the categories of trans-border 
messages being sought.75 The agreement merely indicates the information possibly 
included in the messages (art.5 para.7). SWIFT, however, would not be capable of 
singling out individual communications as its database is not equipped with this kind 
of search capacity.76 Hence, the UST requests issued to the SWIFT company most 
certainly denominate mere standard FIN categories. Effectively, as observed by the 
JSB, the requests cover continuous money flows of entire countries.77 
 
Allegedly, the UST has continuously reduced the amount of data requested by 
cutting down the list of identified message types and geographic regions deemed of 
relevance for counter-terrorism investigations.78 To this end, the SWIFT data 
analysed by the TFTP are regularly audited for their investigative value.79  
Subsequently, TFTP analysts decide on the geographic and material scope of the 
requests and demonstrate the necessity of the requested data by providing past and 
current terrorism risk analyses and concrete past investigations,80 supposedly 
relating to the concerned regions.   
 
                                                          
73 See UST Representations, supra no.25. 
74 Europol, Europol Activities in Relation to the TFTP Agreement - Information Note to the 
European Parliament (1 August 2010 – 1 April 2011) (2011), 7; JSB, supra nos.45, 47. 
75 2nd JSB report, supra no.47; Wesseling (2013), supra no.12, 168, assumes that Muslim 
countries are targeted mostly. 
76 Ambrock, supra no.35, 128. 
77 2nd JSB report, supra no.47. 
78 Europol, supra no.74, 8. 
79 For this and the previous: 2nd Joint Review Report, supra no.48, 25. 
80 Europol, supra no.74, 4. 
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a. Approval by Europol 
An exact copy of the production order with additional substantiation of its necessity 
is sent to Europol81 which is in charge of pre-approving the data transfer (art.4 
paras.3 and 4). The substantiation of the requests does not contain information on 
concrete investigations the data might be needed for, but refers to rather general 
threats emanating from already identified terrorists.82  
 
The assessment of the requests is conducted according to the criteria set-out in 
art.4 para.2. However, it is Europol’s understanding of art.4 para.2 that the review 
is of a purely operational nature. Thus, Europol cross-checks the UST’s 
substantiating information with its own terrorism risk analyses without any legal 
assessment or access to the data requested.83 By approving the requests and 
notifying SWIFT thereof, the production orders gain binding legal effect under 
European and U.S. law and thereby have to be obeyed by SWIFT which can challenge 
the subpoenas under U.S. law only (art.4 paras.5 and 6). Since Europol classifies all 
documents provided by the UST and all processes related to the requests as ‘EU 
restricted’, 84 European judicial and parliamentary oversight depends on the UST’s 
consent to disclosure, which has not been given so far.85 
 
b. Bulk transfer to UST black box 
Eventually, SWIFT’s back-up centre identifies bulk datasets comprising the data 
requested. After having transferred all data within the company’s secure network 
to its U.S. operations centre, data are decrypted and forwarded to a UST server. 
For the purpose of transatlantic data transfer, art.8 of the agreement deems the 
UST as providing an adequate level of data protection as long as compliance with 
the agreement’s privacy and data protection safeguards is ensured. 
 
                                                          
81 Europol set-up a specialised ‘Unit O9’ tasked to implement SWIFT II and advised by 
Europol’s Legal Affairs Unit and its DPO: ibid. 
82 Ibid; regarding those subjects and their respective networks, the UST provides additional 
personal data to Europol: 4th Joint Report, supra no.54, questionnaire no.14. 
83 Europol, supra no.74, 11, 8: whilst this understanding is shared by the Joint Review 
Group (2nd Joint Report, supra no.48, 6), Europol’s DPO and the JSB took the position that 
art.4 para.2 requires an operational and legal assessment. 
84 Europol, supra no.74, 6. 
85 Cf. supra no.44. 
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4. Retention of data in UST black box 
Bulk data provided by SWIFT are stored in the UST’s searchable database. In the 
absence of an initial analysis regarding the data’s concrete relevance for counter-
terrorism purposes, all data-sets are taken into retention directly, irrespective of 
their sensitive nature or expectation of professional secrecy (art.5 para.7). 
Theoretically, the UST is obliged promptly and permanently to delete data 
erroneously transferred by SWIFT (art.6 para.2). However, with regard to the 
breadth of the requests, the transfer of unrequested data is unlikely to happen.  
Also, as will be explained in the consecutive paragraphs, the UST does not delete 
any individual datasets from the warehouse before the maximum retention period 
has expired. 
 
a. Data security and integrity 
The TFTP black box is subject to high security standards as stipulated in art.5 
para.4: The database must provide a secure physical environment, is to be 
maintained with high-capacity systems and be subject to physical intrusion controls; 
transferred data must be stored separately from any other data and the black box 
shall not be interconnected with any other database. Thus, SWIFT messages cannot 
be cross-checked with information from other sources before being formally 
extracted from the black box in course of an individualised search (art.5 paras.5 
and 6). The database is not connected to the Internet and furthermore secured by 
digital security clearances.86 Access to stored data must be limited to TFTP analysts, 
technical supporters, data base managers and overseers. Moreover, data must not 
to be copied except for disaster recovery back-ups and are protected from any 
manipulation, alteration or addition in the black box.87 Interestingly, the latter 
requirement prevents the UST from correcting or deleting incorrect data which are 
therefore merely flagged inaccurate.88 Finally, all searches in the black box (art.5 
para.6) and every onward transfer of TFTP-derived leads (art.7 lit.f) must be log-
filed. 
 
b. Retention period 
The length of retention of individual datasets depends on whether the data are 
extracted or remain unaccessed. Extracted data are retained as long as necessary 
                                                          
86 UST Representations, supra no.24. 
87 Ibid. 
88 2nd Joint Review Report, supra no.48, 11f. 
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for the concrete investigation or prosecution they were extracted for, art.6 para.7. 
Non-extracted data, however, are stored up to five years in the black box, art.6 
para.4.  
 
The agreement remains indefinite as to extracted data that could not affirm any 
suspicion of terrorist activity whatsoever. Art.6 para.1 obliges the UST to delete 
any data no longer deemed necessary for counter-terrorism purposes. Whether art.6 
para.1 refers only to the extracted copies or includes raw data stored in the black 
box, is not clear. Even if the UST would conclude that such data were of no more 
relevance in general, the obligation to delete is subject to technical feasibility. 
According to the UST, however, the administration of the black box and the 
management of massive amounts of data contained therein are highly complex, 
resulting in the UST’s practice of adhering to the five year retention period 
apparently without exception.89  Moreover, reviews of the appropriateness of the 
retention period under art.6 paras.5, 6 and art.13 repeatedly came to the 
conclusion that a shorter time of storage would significantly hamper the 
achievement of the TFTP’s objective.90   
 
5. At the core of the TFTP: extraction and analysis 
The analysis of SWIFT data provided to the UST’s black box is dealt with in art.5. 
Generally, para.2 legitimates processing only for the prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of terrorism or its financing. However, it is para.3 that 
contains the surprising statement that ‘[t]he TFTP does not and shall not involve 
data mining or any other type of algorithmic or automated profiling or computer 
filtering’. On the basis of Wesseling’s work, it will be demonstrated that data 
analysis for the purposes of the TFTP in fact does require the deployment of highly 
sophisticated technologies of automated processing. 
 
a. Targeted search in the black box 
Under the terms of art.5 paras.5 and 6, TFTP investigators have to articulate a 
concrete terrorism nexus in order to access the database for a search. Searches are 
conducted with a TFTP-designed search-and-retrieval software by means of which 
individual names or bank accounts can be run against the entire dataset.91 According 
                                                          
89 Ibid, 10; 3rd Joint Review Report, supra no.51, 15f; 4th Joint Report, supra no.54, 15f. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Cf. TFTP Value Report, supra no.52, 4; Belgian Data Protection Commission, supra 
no.18, 6. 
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to art.5 para.5, this terrorism nexus must be drawn from ‘pre-existing information 
or evidence’ giving ‘a reason to believe’ that the concerned person or bank account 
is associated with terrorist activity. Since the TFTP-derived information is not 
designed to serve as evidence in court proceedings (‘lead purposes only’, art.7 
lit.c),92 the threshold of suspicion does not necessarily amount to the legal criterion 
of reasonable suspicion normally applied in law enforcement operations.  
 
Furthermore, it is not known where the name or bank account number and the 
respective information or evidence is taken from. Allegedly, TFTP investigators run 
searches on suspects’ names from various secret terrorist watch lists maintained by 
FBI and Homeland Security comprising more than a million names, most of which 
are of Muslim origin.93  How persons end up on these watch lists is subject to secrecy 
as well and neither exposed to legal oversight nor individual redress.94  It cannot be 
ruled out that the information the listing is based on was gathered under 
circumstances of severe human rights violations.95  
 
Search terms must be as narrowly tailored as possible and are log-filed together 
with the supporting information (art.5 para.6). The implementation of the criteria 
set out in art.5 paras.5 and 6 is subject to the oversight mechanism of art.12, that 
is to say that SWIFT-scrutineers and EU overseers96 can enter the searches in real 
time or retrospectively, having the authority to block searches or their further 
analysis and dissemination because of inappropriately broad search terms or 
insufficient substantiating material. According to the Joint Review Reports, 
oversight is conducted on (nearly) all searches in the black box, resulting in the 
overseers blocking a minute fraction of all cases for too broad search terms.97  
 
                                                          
92 UST Representations, supra no.25. 
93 Amicelle, supra no.69, 23; Wesseling et al, supra no.12, 55. 
94 Marieke de Goede and Gavin Sullivan, ‘The politics of security lists’ (2016) 34 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 67, 73ff.  
95 Ibid; furthermore: Cf. John Bohannon, ‘Investigating Networks: The Dark Side’ (2009) 
325 Science 410f. 
96 Despite art.12 provides for only one EU appointee, the UST consented to a deputy 
overseer: 2nd Joint Review Report, supra no.48, 8f.  
97 From February 2011 to September 2012, the overseers queried 791 out of 31,797 
searches, of which 57 searches were blocked for overly broad search terms: 2nd Joint 
Review Report, supra no.48, 33; from October 2012 to February 2014, 621 of 22,838 
searches were queried, including 30 queries for too broad search terms: 3rd Joint Review 
Report, supra no.51, 38; between March 2014 and December 2015, the overseers queried 
450 from 27,095 searches, 29 of which were blocked for too broad search terms: 4th Joint 
Review Report, supra no.54, 38. 
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b. Extraction of contact chains 
The method allegedly applied in order to extract the data from the black box is 
called link analysis.98 99  Thereby, starting from a targeted subject, a network of 
contacts is built, mapping associates of associates.100  Also known as ‘contact 
chaining’, this technique of automated data analysis has been deployed by NSA 
investigators in the PRISM programme, going up three links from the person under 
suspicion.101 Since terrorist networks are known to be organised decentrally, their 
associates are seldom linked directly; according to the research the TFTP’s 
conception was probably based on, active participants are on average connected 
through more than four links which can be ‘shortcut’ to less than three by 
identifying complementary participants who, inter alia, provide financial funding.102 
Thus, it is plausible that the TFTP takes three to four ‘hops’ away from the person 
or bank account under suspicion.  
 
Although the UST depicts its approach as ‘extremely targeted’ and only accessing 
data ‘directly responsive’  to the search term,103 it is a known phenomenon since 
1929 that every person can be connected to anybody else worldwide through six 
handshakes;104  in the era of social media, it takes less than four.105 For these 
indiscriminate effects, Wesseling portrays the TFTP as a ‘cluster bomb’.106  
 
                                                          
98 Meyer and Miller, supra no.16.  
99 A form of automated data analysis, link analysis is defined as ‘subject-based […] us[ing] 
public records or other large collections of data to find links between a subject – a 
suspect, an adress, or other piece of relevant information – and other people, places or 
things’ -  DeRosa, supra no.72, VI; the persons (financially) associated with the subject of 
investigation appear as ‘dots’ and their interrelations, appearing as ‘edges’, can be 
qualified in terms of their intensity and centrality to the network or other criteria which 
might be useful for a terrorism investigation – Aparna Basu, ‘Social Network Analysis: A 
Methodology for Studying Terrorism’, in: Mrutyunjaya Panda et al (eds), Social 
Networking: Mining, Visualization and Security (Springer 2014), 215, 221ff. 
100 Basu, ibid, 219. 
101 Kenton Powell and Greg Chen, ‘Three degress of separation’ (The Guardian, 1 
November 2013) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-
surveillance-revelations-decoded#section/1> accessed 02 May 2018; according to 
Wesseling (2013), supra no.12, 160, the CIA went up to five or six links. 
102 Basu, supra no.99, 225ff. 
103 UST Representations, supra no.25. 
104 Albert-László Barabási, ‘Scale-Free Networks: A Decade and Beyond’ (2009) 325 Science 
412. 
105 Smriti Bhagat et al, ‘Three and a half degrees of separation’ (Facebook research, 2016)  
<https://research.fb.com/three-and-a-half-degrees-of-separation/> accessed 08 May 
2017. 
106 Wesseling (2013), supra no.12, 160. 
28 
 
 
 Chapter 1: Background and operation of SWIFT II  
c. Why link analysis alone is not enough 
However, in order to identify terrorist networks, the deployment of link analysis 
alone has been doubted as an appropriate investigative method.107 Since the raw 
networks are based on mere financial linkage between two or more people, they 
necessarily contain a (supposedly high) number of false-positives. This is why the 
assessment of the TFTP-generated networks is the crucial part of each 
investigation.108  According to the UST’s Intelligence Department FinCEN, the 
investigative potential of link analysis is realized through the integration of (many) 
disparate sources of information, thus adding ‘layers of understanding to the 
behaviour that the data represents’.109   
 
This is where techniques of data mining might be combined with link analysis to 
improve a network’s informative value110 and reduce its noise (of false-positives).111 
As opposed to link analysis, data mining is a pattern-based method of automated 
data analysis using algorithms to discover useful, previously unknown knowledge 
hidden in large and complex datasets.112 As long as the data’s quality and the 
comprehensiveness of the data-mining model are adequate, the application of this 
technique can notably reduce the false-positive quota.113 If the assumption of a 
three to four link extraction holds true, the raw networks must be considerably 
large and indiscriminate, requiring a time-efficient and diligent filtering method. 
Against this background, it can be ruled out that TFTP analysts sort out data 
manually.114 
 
d. Quality of TFTP-derived information 
How exactly TFTP analysts distinguish ‘valuable’ from false-positive leads is not 
known; it has neither been revealed how many data-sets are usually extracted from 
the black box nor indicated how many contacts on average are affirmed as 
suspicious. The UST resists disclosing any numbers arguing that a search in the black 
                                                          
107 Bohannon, supra no.95, 410f.  
108 For this and the previous: DeRosa, supra no.72, 14f; Wesseling (2013), supra no.12, 162. 
109 UST (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network), Feasibility of a Cross-Border Electronic 
Funds Transfer Reporting System under the Bank Secrecy Act (2006), 10. 
110 Cf. Bohannon, supra no.95, 411. 
111 DeRosa, supra no.72, 11f. 
112 Ibid, 3. 
113 Ibid, 11f, 14f. 
114 Ambrock, supra no.35, 153ff; Wesseling (2013), supra no.12, 161f.; Hannah C. Bloch-
Wehba, ‘Global Governance in the Information Age: The Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Program’ (2013) 45 NYUJInt’l L&P 595, 635. 
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box can result in multiple hits or none at all.115 Despite art.13 para.2 declaring “the 
number of financial payment messages accessed” in the remit of the Joint Review, 
the reports merely indicate an increase or decrease of SWIFT messages provided to 
the UST black box during the respective review period.116  
 
Nevertheless, the cooperation on the TFTP has been praised as highly valuable, 
filling information gaps and uncovering connections other sources would not spot.117 
According to former UST officials, the TFTP targets predominantly ‘lower- and mid-
level terrorists and financiers who believe they have not been detected.’ ‘[T]racking 
the flow of funds, rather than seeking to disrupt them, to learn how terrorist 
networks are organised’,118 the programme primarily enhances mobility control of 
previously known suspects instead of general data driven surveillance.119 Thus, even 
non-responsive searches can reveal that the suspect probably has withdrawn from 
official financial networks, has moved to another country or has been eliminated 
successfully. 
 
6. Further usage and dissemination 
Finally, it remains secret what exactly TFTP-derived information is consequently 
used for. Most probably, there is a certain back-flow to the terrorist watch lists, 
either resulting in an up- or down-listing of the person under suspicion of terrorist 
activity or their deletion from the list. On the basis of TFTP-derived intelligence, 
administrative action ranging from asset freezing up to extrajudicial detention 
might be initiated by the UST or other U.S. government departments.120 Since TFTP-
derived information shall serve for lead purposes only and is not designed to provide 
evidence in judicial proceedings, the extraction method and analysis is at no point 
subject to judicial review. The review mechanisms established through the 
agreement itself are limited either to the question of access to the black box 
(art.12) or to the value of the ‘output’ of the programme in particular cases 
(art.13). Only the intelligence committees of the U.S. Congress potentially have 
authority to exercise parliamentary control on the TFTP’s analysis methods.121  
                                                          
115 4th Joint Review Report, supra no.54, 9. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Value Report, supra no.52, 5. 
118 For this and the previous: Meyer and Miller, surpa no.16, citing UST Undersecretary 
Stuart Levey. 
119 Amicelle, supra no.69, 10. 
120 Amicelle, ibid, 7f.; Wesseling (2014), supra no.12, 27. 
121 Generally, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence exercise oversight on U.S. intelligence activity. 
30 
 
 
 Chapter 1: Background and operation of SWIFT II  
 
Eventually, ‘leads’ and ‘reports’ are shared with other law enforcement, public 
security or other counter terrorism authorities of the U.S., EU Member States or 
third countries, or with Europol or Eurojust or other appropriate international 
bodies (art.7 lit.b), possibly consisting of raw personal data or a mere summary of 
the analysis conducted by the TFTP beforehand.122  
 
a. Reciprocity mechanisms with Europe 
Data sharing with ‘Europe’ is basically laid down in the provisions on reciprocity 
(arts.9 and 10). That is to say that information can be provided spontaneously by 
the TFTP to Member States, Europol or Eurojust under art.9 or can be requested by 
the Member States, Europol or Eurojust under art.10 if they determine that there is 
a reason to believe that a person or entity has a nexus to terrorism or its financing. 
Whilst Member States’ requests were rarely issued at the beginning of the 
agreement’s implementation, their number has dramatically risen since the attacks 
on the headquarters of Charlie Hebdo123 and are supposedly still increasing in light 
of the high frequency of terrorist incidents on European territory during the last 
year. According to the Joint Reviews, the UST shares single leads or whole reports 
comprised of multiple leads with Member States authorities and Europol on a regular 
basis.124  The communication is normally channelled through Europol’s single point 
of contact.125  Presumably, any TFTP-derived information is classified by the UST 
and thus will also be classified as ‘EU restricted’ by Europol alike.  
  
b. Dissemination to third countries 
Dissemination to third countries, on the other hand, does not require that the 
authority that information is forwarded to must provide an adequate level of data 
protection. Only when the information shared involves a citizen or resident of a 
Member State is the dissemination to a third country subject to prior consent of the 
respective Member State, unless an existing protocol between the UST and the 
Member State provides general allowance or that data sharing is essential for the 
prevention of an immediate and serious threat to public security of the U.S., a 
Member State or a third country. In the latter case, the respective Member State 
shall be notified at the earliest opportunity (art.7 lit.d). 
                                                          
122 Wesseling (2014), supra no.12, 26. 
123 4th Joint Review Report, supra no.53, 50. 
124 For this and the previous: 4th Joint Review Report, supra no.54, 7. 
125 Europol, supra no.74, 5. 
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7. Exercise of individual rights 
In arts.15, 16 and 18, SWIFT II provides for individual rights of the data subject. 
Their exercise in practice turned out to be rather challenging since, due to the 
UST’s restrictive interpretation of the agreement, these rights apply to extracted 
data only and are subject to a number of derogations and limitations.  
 
Firstly, as art.5 para.5 requires a concrete terrorism nexus to be demonstrated 
ahead of any access to the black box, the UST refuses to provide access to 
unextracted data for purposes of art.15.126 Furthermore, the right to access can be 
reduced to the mere statement that the data processing has been in conformity 
with the provisions of the agreement (para.1). However, after data have been 
responsive to a search in the black box and therefore (potentially) display a 
terrorism nexus (though this nexus might be entirely indirect), the derogation clause 
of para.2 applies; thus, the exception of refusing access to information is turned to 
the rule. Para.2 allows for broad derogations of the right to access, inter alia the 
protection of public or national security, regularly including counter-terrorism 
investigations. 
 
Secondly, the right to rectification, erasure and blocking of erroneous data or data 
processed in contradiction to the agreement is hampered by the strict provisions on 
the maintenance of the security and integrity of the database. Whilst any 
application under art.16 requires due substantiation (para.2)127 which, in the 
absence of detailed prior access to the datasets, is already an enormous obstacle 
to any data subject, the UST reduces art.16 to a right to the flagging of data that 
shall be prevented from future processing.128  
 
                                                          
126 3rd Joint Review Report, supra no.51, 17f. 
127 The UST inter alia requires ‘a precise identification of the record, including a 
description of the record, the date, and any other identifying details’ and ‘a statement 
regarding why the information is not accurate or complete, including supporting 
evidence’, ‘If the person making the request wishes to correct or add any information, the 
request is to contain specific proposed language for the desired correction or addition.’ 
<https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Terrorist-Finance-
Tracking/Documents/Revised%20Redress%20Procedures%20for%20Web%20Posting%20(8-8-
11).pdf> accessed 03 July 2018. 
128 Supra no.88; interestingly, ‘to date, no erroneous data have been discovered’ 
<https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Terrorist-Finance-
Tracking/Documents/tftp_brochure_03152016.pdf> accessed 03 June 2018. 
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Thirdly, art.18 para.2 does not provide for a specific right to redress but merely 
refers to U.S. law generally.129 The UST’s website mentions administrative and 
judicial redress under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)130 and the Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA)131.132  With the Umbrella Agreement and the 2015 Judicial 
Redress Act,133 EU citizens and rightful EU residents are furthermore granted redress 
rights under the 1974 U.S. Privacy Act (USPA).134 However, apart from the problem 
of demonstrating legal standing before U.S. courts in secret surveillance cases,135 
the exemptions granted to law enforcement and security agencies effectively 
deprive data subjects of their rights altogether.136 With the TFTP’s exclusive 
purpose of counter-terrorism, injunctive claims are thus most likely to fail. 
 
8. A theory-reality-gap 
The foregoing paragraphs revealed several inconsistencies of the data processing by 
the UST in comparison to SWIFT II’s wording. Nevertheless, the TFTP gradually has 
become an integral part of the EU’s counter-terrorism policy and might even serve 
as a blueprint for an EU TFTS in future. What seems a paradoxical U-turn on behalf 
of the EU137 might be explained by the increasing number of severe terrorist 
incidents on European soil since the adoption of SWIFT II.  
 
However, whether SWIFT II indeed enhanced EU security is difficult to determine. 
Albeit most case studies cited in the Joint Review Reports represent post-attack 
                                                          
129 Whilst art.18 para.2 also refers to the laws of the EU and its Member States, only 
Europol’s approval of the UST requests or EU requests under art.10 could be challenged 
before European courts since there is no EU jurisdiction on UST data processing.  
130 5 U.S.C. Subchapter 2. 
131 5 U.S.C. § 552 (4) (B). 
132 UST, supra no.127. 
133 5 U.S.C. 552a note. 
134 5 U.S.C. § 552a (g)(1). Before, despite art.18 para.2 SWIFT II granting administrative 
and judicial redress to ‘all persons’, affected data subjects did still not fall in the personal 
scope of the Privacy Act due to art.20 para.1 SWIFT II: ‘This Agreement shall not create or 
confer any right or benefit on any person (…)’. 
135 Neil M.Richards, ‘The Dangers of Surveillance’ (2013) 126 Harv LR 1934, 1962ff.; 
Wesseling (2014), supra no.12, 33. 
136 As to FOIA: UST Disclosure Services, ‘Freedom of Information Act Handbook’ (2010), 
16ff; Bloch-Wehba, supra no.114, 623; as to USPA: US Federal Register Vol.79/No.71 (14 
April 2014), 20971; Francesca Bignami, ‘The US Legal System on Data Protection in the 
Field of Law Enforcement. Safeguards, Rights and Remedies for EU Citizens’ (Study for the 
LIBE Committee 2015), 12f. 
137 Anthony Amicelle, ‘The EU’s Paradoxical Efforts at Tracking the Financing of Terrorism: 
From criticism to imitation of dataveillance’ (CEPS 2013). 
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investigations,138 the TFTP’s strategic approach is pre-emptive.139  Whereas it seems 
generally desirable to identify and prevent terrorists from striking, the TFTP comes 
with the downside of collateral damage as an integral feature of the methods 
applied.140 TFTP-verified suspects can be subjected to severe human rights 
intrusions (ranging from restraints in free-movement after a listing on a no-flight 
list to targeted killings);141 those consequences are not necessarily limited to proven 
terrorists but may also be imposed on innocents who are affected merely for their 
everyday interaction with other suspects (and thus in most cases for their 
connection to a geographic area or religious community).   
 
The next chapter investigates whether SWIFT II and the current practice under its 
regime could withstand the CJEU’s scrutiny. Despite the above considerations 
implying that SWIFT II conflicts with several human rights guarantees, the focus of 
the investigation is kept on the rights to privacy and data protection under EU 
primary law. 
 
                                                          
138 Wesseling (2014), supra no.12, 28; in the latest Joint Review Report, the statistics on 
leads shared with European law enforcement agencies corroborates this assumption: supra 
no.54, annex IIIC.  
139 Amicelle, supra no.69, 7. 
140 De Goede/Sullivan, supra no.94, 84 therefore coined the notion of ‘collateral reality’. 
141 Wesseling (2014), supra no.12, 27. 
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C. Chapter 2: SWIFT II from CJEU perspective 
This chapter shall answer the question whether SWIFT II meets the requirements 
established in the CJEU’s recent case law on privacy and data protection. With its 
judgements on the EU General Data Retention Directive and respective national 
legislation, on the Safe Harbour scheme and the EU-Canada PNR-Agreement, the 
CJEU earned its reputation as a Human Rights court setting the benchmark for the 
regulation of new technologies in the digital age.142 Although the focus is kept on 
the CJEU’s landmark decisions, ECtHR case law on secret surveillance shall not 
remain unmentioned in the following section since the CJEU is used to referring to 
its Strasbourg counterpart in light of art.51 para.3 EUCFR.143  
 
Firstly, the CJEU’s general approach on data protection and privacy will be 
introduced; secondly, the CJEU’s considerations on data retention, analysis and 
transfer are applied on SWIFT II according to the consecutive stages of data 
processing identified in chapter 1. Thirdly, in light of the previous findings, it will 
be summed up whether the UST indeed offers an adequate level of data protection 
as assumed in art.8 of the agreement.  
 
I. The CJEU’s approach on privacy and data protection 
As opposed to the European Charter of Human Rights (ECHR),144 art.8 EUCFR 
enshrines a right to data protection separate from the right to privacy found in art.7 
EUCFR. Nonetheless, the CJEU rulings in Digital Rights Ireland, Schrems, Tele 2 
Sverige and PNR Canada display the Court’s understanding that both rights are 
inextricably linked and basically subject to the same interferences, justifications 
and safeguards.145 Just as the ECtHR’s approach on art.8 ECHR, the CJEU has been 
                                                          
142 Cf. Federico Fabbrini, ‘Human Rights in the Digital Age: The European Court of Justice 
Ruling in the Data Retention Case and Its Lessons for Privacy and Surveillance in the United 
States’ (2015) 28 Harv Hum Rts J 65, 81ff. 
143 Inter alia DRI, supra no.9, paras.35, 47, 54, 55: Weber and Saravia v. Germany ECHR 
2006-XI 309, Liberty and Others v. The United Kingdom App. No. 58243/00 (ECtHR, 01 July 
2008), S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom ECHR 2008-V 167, M.K. v. France App. 
No.19522/09 (ECtHR, 18 April 2013); Tele2, ibid, paras.119, 120: Zakharov v. Russia Appl. 
No. 47143/06 (ECtHR, 04 December 2015), Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary Appl. No. 37138/14 
(ECtHR, 12 January 2016). 
144 In absence of a right to data protection in the Convention, the ECtHR understands data 
protection as subset of the right to privacy (art.8 ECHR): Nora Ni Loideain, ‘Surveillance of 
Communications Data and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights’, in: 
Serge Gutwirth et al. (eds) Reloading Data Protection (Springer 2014), 183, 192f. 
145 In DRI, supra no.9, the interrelation of both rights was acknowledged by Advocate 
General Cruz Villalón although he kept arts.7 and 8 EUCFR separate in his Opinion, 
paras.54ff.   
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criticised for neglecting the distinct features of the right to privacy and the right to 
data protection which stem from their character as substantial and procedural 
guarantees respectively.146 However, it is beyond this thesis’ scope to discuss the 
interrelation of arts.7 and 8 EUCFR. The CJEU’s reasoning on the draft EU-Canada 
PNR Agreement particularly lends itself to the legal assessment of SWIFT II; 
therefore, this chapter follows the CJEU’s approach without taking a position as to 
its dogmatic persuasiveness or consistency. 
 
1. General considerations of the Court 
Generally, the Court considers every action of processing of personal data to 
interfere with arts.7 and 8 EUCFR, irrespective of the sensitivity of the data 
affected or the inconvenience caused.147 As following from art.52 para.1 EUCFR, 
any interference with the essence of the rights to privacy or data protection is in 
breach of the Charter; this is deemed to be the case when the content of 
communications is accessed (art.7) or when data is processed in absence of any 
safeguards whatsover (art.8).148 Furthermore, assuming a severe interference with 
both rights, the CJEU recognises that the mass collection and retention of metadata 
can be as sensitive as the processing of content data, running the risk of revealing 
entire personality profiles.149  
 
However, neither art.7 nor art.8 provide for absolute protection;150 the purposes of 
public security, in particular combatting terrorism, are objectives of general 
interest generally capable of justifying severe infringements as long as the measures 
envisaged are proportionate in order to achieve these objectives. That is to say that 
                                                          
146 Aidan Forde, The Conceptual Relationship Between Privacy and Data Protection (2016) 
1 CLR 135, 136, 143, 147ff. (inter alia with further reference to De Hert/Gutwirth and 
Lynskey); Gloria Gonzalez Fuster, ‘Fighting for Your Right to What Exactly – The 
Convoluted Case Law of the EU Court of Justice on Privacy and/Or Personal Data 
Protection’ (2014) 2 Birkbeck LR 263, 267ff.; Xavier Tracol, ‘The judgment of the Grand 
Chamber dated 21 December 2016 in the two joint Tele2 Sverige and Watson cases: The 
need for a harmonised legal framework on the retention of data at EU level’ (2017) 33  
Computer L Security R 541, 549. 
147 PNR Canada, supra no.10, paras.122, 124; DRI, supra no.9, paras.26ff.; Schrems, supra 
no.9, para.87. 
148 DRI, ibid, para.39f.; Schrems, ibid, para.94; PNR Canada, ibid, para.180; interestingly, 
in Tele2, supra no.9, para.101, the Court only referred to content access with regard to 
both rights. 
149 DRI, supra no.9, paras.26ff.; Tele2, supra no.9, para.99; PNR Canada, supra no.10, 
paras.127f; the ECtHR has not yet acknowledged equal protection of metadata but seems 
to prepare for an alignment with the CJEU in that respect: Szabó, supra no.143, para.70; 
Zakharov, supra no.143, para.147; in the pending case of 10 Human Rights Organisations 
v. The United Kingdom App. No. 8170/13, the Court will have the opportunity to do so. 
150 PNR Canada, ibid, para.136. 
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any limitation must not exceed the boundaries of what is appropriate and 
necessary.151 Whilst the CJEU normally grants a certain margin of appreciation to 
the legislator when it comes to appropriateness and necessity,152 in the context of 
privacy and data protection, any derogation and limitation must be strictly 
necessary, requiring the governing rules to be clear and precise in scope and 
application and to impose minimum safeguards against abuse of power.153  
 
2. SWIFT data: all metadata? 
SWIFT data requested and collected for purposes of the TFTP certainly enable UST 
analysts to draw very detailed conclusions on the account holder’s activities on the 
basis of ‘context data’ of every transfer to and from the respective account(s). 
Whether all SWIFT data qualify as metadata, however, might be doubted. If some 
of the information processed by the TFTP was content rather than context data, 
this could provoke a violation of the essence of art.7. On the one hand, it can be 
argued that the transfers’ reference provides some sort of content of the financial 
communication; on the other, EU law (including the CJEU’s case law) lacks a 
consistent definition of metadata altogether.154 It stands to reason to draw an 
analogy to the subject heading of a letter or an e-mail; here, it is also questioned 
whether such information can still be understood as metadata because its mere 
‘envelope’ character cannot be decisive while revealing the underlying content of 
the body of the communication concerned.155 This becomes particularly apparent 
with financial communications: whilst the ‘body’ of each SWIFT message inter alia 
contains the amount of money transferred, it is the reference line which gives away 
a transfer’s purpose. Moreover, this information does not appear necessary for 
either SWIFT as messaging operator or its clients, mostly banks, to provide their 
respective services; rather, it merely serves as an identifier for the recipient 
account holder.  
                                                          
151 Ibid, paras.140, 152f, 154ff. 
152 DRI, supra no.9, para.48. 
153 DRI, ibid, paras.51, 54f.; Schrems, supra no.9, paras.91f.; Tele2, supra no.9, paras. 96, 
103, 109, 117; PNR Canada, supra no.10 para.140, 141. 
154 Cf. Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon et al, ‘Metadata, Traffic Data, Communications Data, 
Service Use Information… What Is the Difference? Does the Difference Matter? An 
Interdisciplinary View from the UK’, in: Serge Gutwirth et al (eds), Data Protection on the 
Move: Current Developments in ICT and Privacy/Data Protection (Springer 2016); Loideain, 
supra no.144, 185. 
155 E.g.: Loideain, ibid, 199; Maria Tzanou, ‘Is Data Protection the Same as Privacy? An 
Analysis of Telecommunications’ Metadata Retention Measures’ (2013) J Internet L 21, 29. 
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Nevertheless, the CJEU’s opinion on the EU-Canada PNR Agreement suggests 
otherwise: As long as data collected does not typically contain private information 
or only reveals such information in particular circumstances and as to limited 
aspects of a person’s private sphere, the essence of art.7 is respected.156 As this 
understanding of content access is reduced to serious cases of privacy intrusions,157 
it would be unlikely for the CJEU to assume a core violation of art.7 with regard to 
SWIFT data because the messages’ references regularly do not contain private 
information; where they do, the information is typically reduced to a very specific 
aspect of privacy.  
 
Any infringement of the essence of art.8 is also out of the question, as it is the 
agreement’s main purpose to establish a data protection regime, whether this 
regime be sufficient or not.158 Whether SWIFT II’s provisions limit the interferences 
with arts.7 and 8 to what is proportionate, will be investigated subsequently. 
 
3. TFTP: an appropriate tool in counter-terrorism? 
SWIFT II legitimises data processing for the prevention, investigation, detection and 
prosecution of terrorism or terrorist financing only (art.1). An objective of high 
priority, inter alia pursuing the protection of the rights and freedoms of others 
(art.6 EUCFR),159 this purpose is capable of justifying far-reaching restrictions to the 
exercise of fundamental rights. Whilst SWIFT II provides a legal basis for the 
interferences in the course of the TFTP’s operation,160 the programme might turn 
out to be an inappropriate means to achieve that objective: it can be assumed that 
(jihadist) terrorists are likely to avoid channelling their monies through official 
systems but prefer alternative means of money transfer (for example the Islamic 
Hawala-system).161 The CJEU, however, took the position that the suitability of a 
measure is not undermined by the possibility of circumventing the usage of certain 
                                                          
156 PNR Canada, supra no.10, para.150. 
157 Boehm/Cole, supra no.11, 33 referring to DRI; however, the Court has been criticised 
for its distinction between content and metadata as regards the essence of privacy and 
data protection: Tracol, supra no.146, 549f.; Tuomas Ojanen, ‘Making the Essence of 
Fundamental Rights Real: The Court of Justice of the European Union Clarifies the 
Structure of Fundamental Rights under the Charter’ (2016) 12 EuConst 318, 327f. 
158 Dissenting: Maria Tzanou, The Fundamental Right to Data Protection, Normative Value 
in the Context of Counter-Terrorism Surveillance (Hart Publ. 2017), 211. 
159 DRI, supra no.9, para.42; PNR Canada, supra no.10, para.149 
160 Cf. PNR Canada, ibid, para.144ff. on the question whether an international agreement 
is a suitable legal basis in terms of art.52 EUCFR. 
161 This question was raised as early as 2006 by the U.S. House of Representatives: supra 
no.24. 
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technologies.162  Moreover, when it comes to less intrusive alternatives, it can be 
ruled out that other means of law enforcement cooperation are indeed as efficient 
as SWIFT II’s mechanism. Under art. 4 EU-US MLA-Agreement, requests must be 
individualised and based on reasonable suspicion (para.2 thereof); in order to trace 
the money flows of a single suspect, it might be necessary to approach several EU 
Member States for legal assistance, considerably delaying the acquisition of 
information. The TFTP’s purpose to identify hitherto unknown terrorist associates 
would be hampered, if not entirely undermined.163  
 
Thus, processing of mass SWIFT data can be deemed appropriate for counter-
terrorism purposes in general. In the next section, the scheme’s consecutive steps 
of data processing will be assessed against the Court’s requirements on strict 
necessity. 
 
II. From UST requests to intelligence sharing: Is SWIFT II strictly necessary to 
fight terrorist financing? 
The criterion of strict necessity refers both to the formal quality of the law (‘clear 
and precise rules’) and the procedural safeguards provided against the abuse of 
power. In this respect, the CJEU criteria coincide with the legality principle applied 
in ECtHR case law, including the so-called Weber criteria for laws on secret 
surveillance.164 The findings of chapter 1 already indicate that the agreement’s 
wording is not sufficiently clear and precise. The following paragraphs will 
demonstrate that every single stage of data processing is likely to fall at the hurdle 
of strict necessity, for reasons of indefinite discretion of the UST and a lack of 
sufficient safeguards alike. 
 
1. UST requests: general data retention? 
The bulk transfers of European SWIFT data to the UST have been a thorn in EU data 
protectionists’ sides from the beginning of negotiations on a cooperational 
agreement with the U.S. Whereas SWIFT I expressly allowed for bulk data to be 
provided to the UST,165 the wording of SWIFT II neither bans nor approves mass data 
                                                          
162 DRI, supra no.9, para.48. 
163 Dissenting: Tzanou, supra no.158, 209. 
164 Schrems, supra no.9, Opinion of AG Bot, para.193; Weber, supra no.143, paras.84ff., 
94.  
165 Art.4 para.6 SWIFT I read as follows: ‘If the Designated Provider is not able to identify 
and produce the specific data that would respond to the request because of technical 
reasons, all potentially relevant data shall be transmitted in bulk (…)’. 
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transfers. Although it has never been confirmed how many data are transferred on 
average, Europol’s JSB observed that financial flows of entire countries are 
continually subject to the UST’s requests. In light of the five year retention period, 
this practice of bulk transfers might amount to general data retention. 
 
The Court’s annulment of the General Data Retention Directive was interpreted 
differently, as to whether the verdict meant that any system of general data 
retention, irrespective of the safeguards provided, would violate arts.7 and 8 
EUCFR.166 The ruling in Tele2 Sverige spells out that indiscriminate (strategic) data 
collection and retention of commercial data for preventive purposes is in breach of 
the Charter. For the objective of crime prevention, only targeted data retention 
might concur with EU Fundamental Rights and must be limited to what is absolutely 
necessary regarding the data categories concerned, the means of communication 
included, the groups of persons affected and the length of retention, thereby 
establishing a certain link between the objective pursued and the data processed.167  
Art.4 paras.1 and 2 on first sight seem to adhere to these criteria by limiting the 
scope of the UST requests inter alia to specific geographic areas, time periods and 
data categories to be denominated. Nevertheless, these provisions might not lay 
down sufficiently clearly and precisely what exactly is to be understood by that and 
thus might not exclude general retention of all FIN data processed through SWIFT’s 
network. Moreover, it is questionable if SWIFT II provides sufficient safeguards 
enabling the affected data subjects to protect their data efficiently. 
 
Since the retention of SWIFT data will be examined as a separate interference with 
the rights under arts.7 and 8 EUCFR at a later stage, it only shall be stressed at this 
point that a retention period of five years considerably increases the amount of 
data stored in the black box. In fact, if financial data of a period of multiple years 
were analysed, they could reveal personality profiles more precisely than air 
travelling data retained for the same period (even if collected globally). The 
                                                          
166 The Directive failed to comply with the Charter for its blanket nature; however, it was 
doubted whether the intention of the ruling was to allow for targeted data retention only: 
cf. Maria Helen Murphy, ‘Algorithmic surveillance: the collection conundrum’ (2017) Int’l 
RL, Computers & Techn 31, 225, 233f. 
167 Tele2, supra no.9, paras.108ff; confirmed in PNR Canada, supra no.10, paras.190ff.; 
with a critical stance on the judgement’s restrictive approach: Iain Cameron, ‘Balancing 
data protection and law enforcement needs: Tele2 Sverige and Watson’ (2017) 54 CMLR 
1467, 1481f. 
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following examination of affected data categories, persons and means of 
communication shall take this into consideration. 
 
a. Data categories collected 
Firstly, SWIFT II remains unclear as to which data categories are liable to processing 
by the UST. In the context of PNR data, the CJEU did not accept incomprehensive 
descriptions of data categories.168 As elaborated above, art.5 para.7 does not list 
specific FIN message types but merely indicates the information which can be 
derived from requested FIN data in a non-exhaustive manner. The data categories 
this information is drawn from, however, are not identified in the agreement. 
Moreover, the range of personal information accessible to TFTP investigators is 
possibly much wider than art.5 para.7 suggests.169 This lack of definition is neither 
remedied by art.1 para.1 also referring generally to ‘financial transfers and related 
data’, nor by art.6 para.2 obliging the UST to immediately delete non-requested 
data without clarifying which data can be rightfully requested in the first place.  
 
Furthermore, SWIFT II does not establish any particular safeguards for sensitive 
data. In PNR Canada, the Court required an extraordinarily high level of justification 
for processing sensitive data in order to comply with arts.7, 8 and 21 EUCFR because 
of the inherent risk of stigmatisation of data subjects concerned.170 However, it can 
be left unanswered here if the exclusive purpose of counter-terrorism could serve 
as a sufficient objective in this regard.171 As art.5 para.7 states that sensitive data 
were highly unlikely to result from the requests, the TFTP’s functioning evidently 
does not depend on the processing of sensitive information in any way. Still, it 
cannot be ruled out that sensitive information is contained in the SWIFT messages. 
From this perspective, it is difficult to see why the processing of sensitive data is 
not banned from the outset172 or at least restricted after transfer by rigid masking 
or express deletion requirements. Against the background of (presumably) mostly 
Muslim countries being targeted by the UST requests,173 any misuse of SWIFT data 
                                                          
168 PNR Canada, ibid, para.160. 
169 For instance, ‘sometimes even bills of lading’: 2nd Joint Review Report, 38 (Annex IV). 
170 PNR Canada, supra no.10, paras.141, 164ff. 
171 Ibid, the Court dissented: ‘Having regard to the risk of data being processed contrary to 
Article 21 of the Charter, a transfer of sensitive data requires […] grounds other than the 
protection of public security against terrorism and serious transnational crime’. 
172 By analogy for the Umbrella-Agreement: EDPS, Opinion 1/2016, 
<https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/16-02-12_eu-
us_umbrella_agreement_en.pdf> accessed 06 July 2018, para.36 with further references. 
173 Wesseling (2013), supra no.12, 168. 
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for ‘religious’ or ‘ethnic profiling’ should be prevented by appropriate safeguards 
in order to comply with the principle of non-discrimination. On the contrary, art.5 
para.7 treats sensitive data equally to other SWIFT data, thereby violating arts.7 
and 8 EUCFR and art.21 EUCFR respectively. 
 
These shortcomings are best demonstrated with regard to information potentially 
derived from reference information: Whilst art.5 para.7 does not mention this data 
category at all, it is suggested here that the transaction’s reference is the most 
likely to contain sensitive data since it gives away the transaction’s purpose, for 
example a donation to a sectarian charity. In the aftermath of 9/11, Muslim 
charities were under particular focus of U.S. counter-terrorism investigations.174 In 
that regard, it can be assumed that the agreement’s wording is misleading to say 
the least, when emphasising that sensitive data is extracted only in exceptional 
circumstances.175 
 
A similar argument can be made for the absence of protection for data subject to 
professional secrecy. Although personal data concerning the work of journalists or 
the privileged relationship between client and attorney do not fall under the 
definition of sensitive data,176 they require no less rigid safeguards in order to 
protect the rights enshrined under art.11 EUCFR.177 It is not improbable that such 
data could be derived from trans-border transactions in course of international 
mandates or journalistic investigations. Nevertheless, the agreement remains tacit 
as to the processing of those data categories, let alone as to the specific safeguards 
applicable. 
 
Whilst terrorist financiers most probably disguise their transfers’ purposes, innocent 
account holders could protect their sensitive information more efficiently if they 
were aware of the full range of data collected by the UST or if processing of sensitive 
and similar data was interdicted generally. Conclusively, the agreement neither lays 
down sufficiently clear and precise rules on the data categories processed nor 
                                                          
174 See: Marieke de Goede, Speculative Security: The Politics of Pursuing Terrorist Monies 
(University of Minnesota Press 2012), 125ff. 
175 The UST Representations called it ‘highly unusual for SWIFT records to include sensitive 
data’. 
176 Cf. art.10 Directive (EU) 2016/680 on special categories of personal data. 
177 DRI, supra no.9, paras.56ff. where the question of professional secrecy is elaborated 
with regard to the groups of persons affected by data collection. 
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minimum safeguards for the processing of particularly sensitive categories of 
personal data. 
 
b. Persons and providers affected 
Secondly, suggesting a character of general rather than targeted data retention, 
the number of affected data subjects is supposedly extraordinarily high. According 
to art.4, UST requests are supposed to identify certain geographic areas and time 
periods associated to terrorist activity. It can be doubted, however, whether the 
risk analyses the requests are based on establish a sufficient link between the 
persons affected and the TFTP’s objective. As observed by Europol’s JSB, the 
production orders’ broadness indicates otherwise. 
 
However, the Court’s notion of ‘targeted data retention’ should not be equated 
with the requirement of an individualised suspicion necessary to take data into 
storage in the first place:178 The existence of an indirect link is a satisfactory 
threshold; this link can be of geographical or temporal nature.179 The PNR Canada 
opinion confirmed that an initial mass retention of data on probably unsuspicious 
persons does not constitute an a priori violation of the Charter if otherwise the 
identification of unknown security risks through techniques of automated analysis 
would be rendered impossible.180 It is exactly the TFTP’s purpose to detect new 
terrorism suspects by sophisticated processing of data stemming from regions 
associated with an increased terrorism risk. Thus far, the acquisition and storage of 
financial data concerning entire countries matches the Court’s criterion of targeted 
data retention.  
 
Furthermore, the data requested by the UST represent a mere small fraction of the 
total amount of SWIFT messages generated in SWIFT’s European processing zone. 
The fact that SWIFT’s FIN network provides a messaging service for trans-border 
money flows, whilst inner-national transfers are communicated through domestic 
clearing houses, leads to the exclusion of most everyday transactions as they are 
                                                          
178 For instance Alexander Roßnagel, ‘Neue Maßstäbe für den Datenschutz in Europa aus 
dem EuGH-Urteil zur Vorratsdatenspeicherung’ (2014) MMR 372, 375f. concluded that only 
‘quick freeze’ could be compliant with the Court’s understanding of lawful data retention. 
179 Tele2, supra no.9, 108ff; Aqilah Sandhu, ‚Anmerkung zum Urteil des EuGH vom 
21.12.2016 in der Rs. C-203/15 (Tele2)’ (2017) 52 Europarecht 453, 462f., points out that 
the threshold of individual/reasonable suspicion can only apply at the second stage of 
processing for purposes of consulting the data retained. 
180 PNR Canada, supra no.10, paras.187, 196. 
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(generally speaking) unlikely to require cross-border remittances. A major 
percentage of those transfers is furthermore excluded by art.4 para.2 lit.d 
prohibiting the UST to seek SEPA data (also communicated in SWIFT FIN standard). 
Persons making payments in Euro are not liable to data collection,181 thus protecting 
a considerabe number of cross-border travellers, entrepreneurs and employees.   
 
Consequently, the data collection under SWIFT II seems hardly comparable with 
measures envisaged under the former Data Retention Directive which basically 
subjected the entire European population to communications surveillance.182 This is 
confirmed by the fact that, apart from SWIFT-generated data, no other financial 
communication service is targeted by the agreement. Irrespective of SWIFT’s 
factual monopoly regarding trans-border interbank financial transfer messages, 
alternative and growing services, for example in the e-money business (PayPal), are 
not data sources for the TFTP.  
 
Hence, it is arguable that SWIFT II is sufficiently precise and clear regarding the 
means of communication and persons affected by enumerating designated providers 
and limiting the data of interest to geographic areas associated with a certain level 
of terrorist threat. Nonetheless, the Court asks for sufficient safeguards ensuring 
the efficient protection of data subjects and preventing the abuse of power. Here, 
the agreement’s mandate to Europol to conduct oversight on the requests appears 
to have several weaknesses in breach of art.8 para.3 EUCFR. 
 
c. Europol approval: a sufficient safeguard against abuse of power? 
The European Courts show a clear preference for judicial control of governmental 
access to personal data;183 however, neither the ECtHR nor the CJEU insist on prior 
authorisation by a judicial authority under all circumstances. Whilst the Strasbourg 
Court in its latest decision requires a court approval ahead of data transfers to other 
countries,184 the CJEU did not apply this hurdle to PNR-transfers to Canada which 
are neither authorised by a judge nor another supervisory body.185 
                                                          
181 As the implementation of the SEPA-standard across Europe took considerably longer 
than expected when SWIFT II had been adopted, the TFTP could request inner-european 
payments until 2016: cf. Ambrock, supra no.35, 74. 
182 DRI, supra no.9, para.56. 
183 As to the ECtHR: Murphy, supra no.166, 231f. 
184 Szabó, supra no.143, paras.77ff. 
185 Cf. PNR Canada, supra no.10, para.193. 
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In context of SWIFT II, however, the Parties apparently saw the necessity of an ex 
ante oversight mechanism186 which consequently must meet the requirements 
established in European case law:187 Irrespective of the (non-)judicial character of 
the authority, any supervisory body must provide sufficient independence, 
impartiality and proper procedure. Europol’s clear interest in smooth cooperation 
with the UST under the agreement188 is difficult to reconcile with the need of 
impartiality: according to art.10, Europol can request the conduct of TFTP searches 
on its own behalf and has done so in multiple cases since SWIFT II’s entry into force 
in summer 2010.189 Apprehensions were confirmed when the former JSB observed 
that not a single UST request was rejected by Europol despite the subpoenas’ level 
of abstraction hampering any assessment against the criteria set out in art.4 para.1 
and 2.  
 
Apart from Europol’s overly tolerant attitude towards this abstraction, its purely 
operational assessment of the requests, irrespective of their legal compliance with 
the agreement, casts further doubt on the effectiveness of the procedure. If Europol 
is deemed to be fulfilling the mandate under art.8 para.3 EUCFR, it is primarily 
tasked to safeguard the legal requirements emanating from art.8 paras.1 and 2 
EUCFR.190  ECtHR case law on secret surveillance measures affirms that for purposes 
of prior or subsequent oversight, the authority’s scope of review must comprise the 
factual and legal aspects of the respective operation.191 An operational assessment 
might serve as an additional layer of control, however, it cannot replace legal 
scrutiny altogether. The abstract character of non-individual requests cannot lead 
to the conclusion that effective judicial or administrative oversight is superfluous; 
on the contrary, if the high level of abstraction hampers supervision, the requests 
must be rejected.  
                                                          
186 The ex ante approval by an EU institution was urged by MEPs after rejection of SWIFT I; 
however, under art.4 paras.3-5 SWIFT I, an authority of the Member States hosting SWIFT’s 
headquarter and its European server (Netherlands and Belgium) would have been charged 
with the provision of SWIFT data on the basis of MLA Agreements, thereby in fact 
conducting an assessment under national data protection law. 
187 PNR Canada, supra no.10, paras.228f. and Schrems, supra no.9, para.41 referring to 
C̻288/12 Commission v. Hungary [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:237, para.48 and C̻518/07 
Commission v. Germany [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:125, para.25; Zakharov, supra no.143, 
para.258, 275; Szabó, supra no.139 para.77, 80. 
188 Cf. EDPS, supra no.41. 
189 For instance, according to the 4th Joint Review Report, Europol initiated 74 requests on 
own behalf and transmitted 120 Member States requests during the review period 
2014/2015: supra no.54, 7. 
190 PNR Canada, supra no.9, para.228. 
191 Zakharov, supra no.143, paras.260ff. 
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d. Limited ex-post legal scrutiny 
Europol’s failure in interpreting the standard of oversight laid down in art.4 paras.1-
4 is hardly remedied by further provisions of the agreement: the production order 
itself and its binding legal effect (remarkably, under EU and U.S. law) can be 
challenged by SWIFT only and exclusively before U.S. courts; against administrative 
subpoenas, however, the review is limited to the question of reasonability192 
irrespective of the requirements stipulated in the agreement.  
 
Theoretically, Europol’s approval decision is subject to administrative and judicial 
review, art.18 para.2 providing ‘any person who considers his or her data to have 
been processed in breach of the agreement [with the right to] effective […] redress 
[…] in accordance with the laws of the European Union, its Member States and the 
United States, respectively’. As to administrative redress, the new 2016 Europol 
Directive mandates the EDPS with handling individual complaints concerning alleged 
data protection breaches of Europol (art.47 and art.43 para.2 lit.a thereof). As 
opposed to the former JSB, the EDPS is vested with the authority to interdict any 
acts of data processing in contradiction of the Regulation and other EU data 
protection rules (art.43 para.2 lit.c, para.3 lit.f) and with the right to escalate a 
case to the CJEU (art.43 para.3 lit.h). However, since 1 May 2017 (when the 
Regulation became effective) the EDPS apparently has not raised the issue of 
Europol’s approval practice despite the JSB’s previous reports.193 Whilst the new 
Europol Regulation thus could fill the gap of administrative redress on European 
behalf, the practice to be established by the EDPS in overseeing Europol will 
demonstrate whether the Regulation can serve as a sufficient safeguard for the 
purposes of SWIFT II. 
 
As to judicial redress, every act of an EU agency can be challenged before the CJEU 
according to art.263 paras.1 and 4 TFEU.194 However, it cannot be predicted if the 
Court could finally provide effective protection to the data subjects due to the 
UST’s lack of consent to disclosure:195 The so-called principle of originator’s control 
would most probably prevent Europol from disclosing the documents substantiating 
                                                          
192 Bignami, supra no.136, 16. 
193 EDPS, Annual Report 2017 (2018) 
<https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-03-
15_annual_report_2017_en.pdf> accessed 22 June 2018, 22ff. 
194 The question of admissibility will be elaborated in the concluding chapter. 
195 This happened before when the UST refused consenting to disclosure of the JSB reports: 
supra no.44. 
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the requests. As a rigid principle of European law and a core value of Europol,196 the 
principle of originator’s control hardly allows any balancing with the individual 
rights in question; as a result, the Court possibly would lack the factual basis197 to 
assess Europol’s approval against the criteria described above. Without having a say 
on the classification of documents by the UST in the first place, however, it is 
difficult to see how Europol could be held responsible for adhering to its 
confidentiality obligations under the Europol Regulation.198 
 
In light of these considerations, it is a major flaw of SWIFT II not to provide for an 
EU mechanism for individual redress,199 leaving the agreement with insufficient 
safeguards for the protection of data subjects from UST data requests incompatible 
with the limitations set out in art.4 paras.1 and 2. 
 
2. Data retention in the black box 
Whilst the bulk transfer of financial messaging data from SWIFT to the UST thus can 
qualify as a measure of targeted data retention which does not a priori violate arts.7 
and 8 EUCFR, SWIFT II ‘s  data retention period of five years is a considerable long 
time and might lead to a very precise picture of a person’s personal life and how it 
has changed. In several reviews, the UST repeatedly took the position that the 
retention cannot be shortened generally because 35-45 percent of the data 
identified as crucial for their investigations had been retained for three years or 
longer.200   
 
a. Five years of retention: five years of suspicion 
In Digital Rights Ireland, the Court found a maximum retention of three years 
incompatible with arts.7 and 8 EUCFR stressing that the length of retention must 
result from objective criteria.201 According to the Court’s reasoning in Tele2 Sverige 
                                                          
196 Artur Gruszczak, Intelligence Security in the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan 
2016), 256f.; the principle of originator’s control is enshrined in art.19 paras.1 and 2 
Europol-Regulation; the handling of EU-restricted documents is regulated on the basis of 
art.67 para.2. 
197 For this and the previous: V. Abazi, ‘The future of Europol's parliamentary oversight: a 
great leap forward?’ (2014) 15 German LJ 1121, 1123, 1126ff. with further references. 
198 The Venice Commission, Report on the Democratic Oversight of Signals Intelligence 
Agencies (CDL-AD(2015)011), paras.13, 125 therefore suggests that this principle should 
not apply to oversight bodies generally.  
199 Bloch-Wehba, supra no.114, 623. 
200 TFTP Value Report, supra no.52, 11ff. 
201 DRI, supra no,9, para.65. 
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and reaffirmed in its opinion on the PNR Canada Agreement,202 the provisions on the 
retention period have to be clear and precise, establishing a certain link to the 
objective pursued. However, the mere average lifespan of international [terrorist] 
networks and the complexity of investigations  cannot serve as an objective 
criterion demonstrating a sufficient link between data of generally unsuspicious 
persons and the purpose of combatting terrorism.203 Hence, the argument that a 
considerable amount of long-term stored data has proven useful for the TFTP’s 
operation cannot per se justify the five year retention period. In particular, the 
retention period must mirror the usefulness of the respective data categories for 
the investigative purposes204 and generally differentiate between suspicious and 
unsuspicious persons.205 
 
The retention under the TFTP scheme does not vary as to different data categories 
which are equally stored for five years irrespective of their average exploitability 
for the investigations. Whilst it shall not be guessed here what data categories might 
be dispensable before the five year period expires, any partial deletion from or 
masking of the datasets would supposedly contradict the UST’s interpretation of the 
strict integrity requirements set out in art.5 para.4 prohibiting any alteration or 
manipulation of data. For this reason, the UST refuses to delete erroneous data 
despite art.17 para.1 expressly referring to ‘supplementation, deletion or 
correction’ in order to maintain the accuracy of the data received. Although the 
Court repeatedly pointed out the importance of safeguards on data integrity and 
confidentiality,206 those provisions however primarily aim at preventing any misuse 
of data and thereby can hardly serve as an objective criterion in order to extend 
the retention period of data categories which are no longer of use for counter-
terrorism investigations; this would result in the paradoxical outcome of data being 
exposed to an even greater risk of misuse. 
 
For the five years of storage, SWIFT data transferred to the UST are maintained in 
a general status of suspicion unless extracted from the black box. It becomes clear 
from the Court’s case law that for ongoing storage, the ‘Agreement must continue 
                                                          
202 Tele2, supra no.9, para.188; PNR Canada, supra no.10, paras.191, 209 which accepted 
a five year period for data of persons who were found suspicious after initial data analysis 
or evidence collected until departure. 
203 PNR Canada, ibid, para.205. 
204 DRI, supra no.9, para.65. 
205 PNR Canada, supra no.10, paras.204ff. 
206 DRI, supra no.9, para.66; Tele2, supra no.9, para.122 
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to satisfy the objective criteria which established the connection between the 
personal data to be retained and the purpose pursued’.207 Consequently, an ongoing 
threat assessment with regards to data categories, geographic area and time period 
equivalent to the initial assessment as laid down in art.4 paras.1 and 2 is required. 
Theoretically, this is exactly what is supposed to happen under art.6 para.1 stating 
that ‘the U.S. Treasury Department shall undertake an ongoing and at least annual 
evaluation to identify non-extracted data that are no longer necessary to combat 
terrorism or its financing’. In fact, however, the UST does not delete any data 
before the retention period expires due to technical obstacles. The CJEU stressed 
that all technical and organisational measures have to be taken in order to reduce 
the risks of data misuse irrespective of economic interests.208 This argument can be 
applied here by analogy as, eventually, it is cost-intensity caused by the complexity 
of the database hampering the UST from deleting unnecessary data. In this regard, 
art.6 para.1 leaves too much discretion to the executive when obliging the UST to 
delete ‘as soon as technologically feasible’.  
 
Even if the deletion indeed proved technically undoable (which should provoke the 
question if data should be retained in the black box at all), the UST is apparently 
capable of at least flagging erroneous datasets in order to prevent them from 
further usage. It is difficult to understand why this should not apply to data 
understood as being no longer necessary for counter-terrorism purposes. 
Apparently, despite the existence of direct EU oversight according to art.12 and 
repeated reviews under art.13, this weakness in the retention scheme has not been 
tackled so far. 
 
To sum up, the retention period is not based on objective criteria and the agreement 
lacks suffiently clear rules as to the UST’s obligation to delete data which are 
deemed as no longer necessary for the achievement of the TFTP’s objectives. 
 
b. No individual rights for ex ante unsuspicious persons 
Due to the UST’s restrictive interpretation of SWIFT II, enforcing individual rights is 
not possible before personal data are extracted from the black box. Paradoxically, 
                                                          
207 PNR Canada, supra no.10, para.191. 
208 DRI, supra no.9, para.67; in this regard, the Court’s reasoning goes beyond the standard 
established by Directive (EU) 2016/680 which obliges the controller to implement 
technical and organisational measures with due (but not exclusive) regard to the costs 
coming with it (recital 53 thereof). 
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data subjects cannot rely on their individual rights to access, deletion, rectification, 
blocking or redress in order to have their datasets erased from the black box or 
otherwise prevented from processing in the first place.  
 
Whilst the Joint Review Group has accepted this practice so far, it is at odds with 
the CJEU’s longstanding case law. As the Court had pointed out as early as 2009, 
the right to privacy ‘means that the data subject may be certain that his personal 
data are processed in a correct and lawful manner, that is to say, in particular, that 
the basic data regarding him are accurate’.209 Consequently, access (and 
consecutive rights) must generally be provided at any stage of data processing in 
order to prevent the authorities relying on incorrect or unnecessary data. Moreover, 
limiting individual rights to extracted data is not compliant with SWIFT II’s clear 
intention to enhance the rights of individual data subjects. This is mirrored in the 
preamble, emphasising effective protection of privacy and personal data,210 as well 
as in the existence of a right to rectification or deletion which is practically 
rendered invalid if incorrect or unnecessary data had to be extracted and analysed 
beforehand. The UST’s interpretation (based on art.5 paras.2, 4 lit.c, 5 and 6) 
reducing access to counter-terrorism investigations demonstrates incoherent rules 
and safeguards governing the access to the black box or the UST’s lack of 
commitment to fundamental rights protection. Either alternative constitutes a 
violation of arts.7 and 8 EUCFR. 
 
c. Retention of extracted data 
Regarding extracted data, it was observed in chapter 1 that the agreement remains 
indefinite as to the handling of information on data subjects who were relieved of 
the general suspicion of terrorist activity. In its PNR Canada opinion, the CJEU 
stressed that a long-term storage of data concerning persons who were not 
identified as being potential suspects after an initial data analysis violates arts.7 
and 8 EUCFR.211 In case of PNR data, the datasets transferred to third country border 
control agencies are profiled automatically at the time of arrival and departure. 
Therefore, the Court considers any retention beyond this point in breach of the 
Charter if the data were not responsive to the profiling algorithms. In specific cases, 
                                                          
209 Case C-553/07 College van burgemeester en wethouders van Rotterdam v M. E. E. 
Rijkeboer (2009) ECLI:EU:C:2009:293, para.49. 
210 Recitals 6, 7, 8, 13, 14 and 16. 
211 PNR Canada, supra no.10, paras.204ff.; similar: ECtHR, supra no.143, in S. and Marper, 
paras.122ff., and M.K., para.39. 
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however, when objective evidence suggests that certain air passengers may pose a 
further security risk, storage and use of their data beyond departure are permissible 
if based on objective criteria (supposedly: reasonable suspicion) and if subsequent 
access is subject to prior approval by a judicial or independent administrative body 
following a reasoned request on behalf of the investigating authority.212 
 
It stands to reason to draw an analogy to the extraction and analysis of SWIFT data 
for the detection of so far unknown terrorist associates. Whilst the TFTP’s approach 
is based on a different technology of analysis, the extraction process serves the 
same objective, namely to either confirm or refute a potential terrorism nexus. As 
soon as no link could be confirmed, the data subjects concerned cannot be treated 
equally to persons who are proven to have a terrorism nexus or persons whose data 
has not yet undergone analysis. The mere possibility that a terrorism nexus might 
be revealed in other contexts cannot serve as an argument to keep their financial 
data retained in the black box as if they have not been queried at all. Against the 
background of the UST’s refusal to delete any data before expiry of the retention 
period, datasets concerned could (at least) be flagged to signal their status of minor 
suspicion. Without referring to the handling of data of ex post unsuspicious persons 
at any point, however, art.6 para.7 does not lay down sufficiently clear and precise 
rules and appropriate safeguards when it comes to retention of extracted data.  
 
d. Data extracted, individual rights derogated? 
As much as the agreement’s provisions on individual rights fail to achieve any 
protection for ‘unsuspicious’ data subjects, they prove inefficient in practice when 
it comes to persons whose data are extracted from the black box. This is mostly due 
to deficiencies in the right to access enshrined in art.15. As the CJEU held in its PNR 
Canada opinion, rules must be laid down in a clear and precise manner on the 
substantial and procedural requirements of the access, including the nature of 
information that may be disclosed, the persons to whom such disclosure may be 
made and if the disclosure is subject to prior authorisation of a court or an 
administrative body. Furthermore, any derogation from the right to access must be 
limited to what is strictly necessary by clearly defining the legitimate objectives 
which can serve as justification for the denial of disclosure. 213 
                                                          
212 PNR Canada, ibid, paras.207f. 
213 For this and the previous: Ibid, paras.216f. 
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Whilst access under art.15 theoretically implies ‘disclosure of personal data’ 
(para.2), it can be assumed that data subjects are merely provided with a 
‘confirmation that their rights have been respected’ in course of TFTP data 
processing (para.1). In the latter case, however, data subjects cannot derive if their 
data were transferred to the black box nor if data were accessed at all. Resulting 
from paras.2 and 3, access to datasets can be (partly) restricted or (entirely) 
refused for ‘reasonable’ grounds under national law. Without enumerating the 
corresponding limitations applicable under U.S. law, para.2 solely refers to the 
safeguarding of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of criminal 
offences, public security and national security. Apart from the low threshold of 
reasonableness and the broad understanding of the notion of national security in 
the U.S.,214 the general reference to ‘criminal offences’ is at odds with the TFTP’s 
limited purpose of counter-terrorism. Even if interpreted narrowly as including only 
the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of terrorism and terrorist 
financing, the U.S. definition of terrorism is much wider than the definition found 
in art.2 SWIFT II. It was exactly this divergence that prompted EU negotiators to 
insist on a narrower definition of terrorism and terrorism financing as found in 
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and the 3rd EU Anti-Money-Laundering 
Directive.215 Against this background, the objectives allowing for derogations from 
the right to access are not clearly defined.216 
 
Moreover, according to the UST Representations, data extracted from the black box 
is understood to be directly linked to a terrorism suspect. Hence, the mere 
extraction is sufficient to justify any limitation of access under art.45 para.2. 
Although every restriction or refusal has to be explained in writing (para.3), it can 
be ruled out that this information gives away any indication as to the circumstances 
of the extraction in order not to undermine the derogation altogether.217 Without 
                                                          
214 By analogy for the Umbrella-Agreement: Douwe Korff, ‘EU-US Umbrella Data Protection 
Agreement: Detailed analysis by Douwe Korff’ (14 October 2015) <https://free-
group.eu/2015/10/14/eu-us-umbrella-data-protection-agreement-detailed-analysis-by-
douwe-korff/> accessed 21 November 2017, at II.iv. 
215 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002) OJ L164/3; 
Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 
on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering 
and terrorist financing (2005) OJ L309/15.  
216 See, by analogy, Opinion of AG Bot in Schrems, supra no.9, paras.162ff.; Korff, supra 
no.214, at II.iii. 
217 See the UST’s response to Cristina Blasi Casagran, ‘Global Data Protection in the Field 
of Law Enforcement’ (Routledge 2016), 99 who was neither confirmed nor denied of the 
existence of any responsive records because ‘the disclosure of such information could 
identify subjects of ongoing counter-terrorism investigations or harm national security’. 
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disclosure of the data extracted, however, the right to access finally loses its 
function as ‘door opener’ for other individual rights, namely the right to 
rectification, erasure and blocking. As stated in art.16 para.2, any application for 
rectification, erasure or blocking shall be duly substantiated. The respective UST 
guidelines impose an extraordinarily high threshold,218 in fact rendering any 
application inadmissible without prior knowledge of the exact datasets.  
 
Nevertheless, access, rectification, erasure and blocking are not placed under 
sufficient oversight mechanisms: the on-site EU scrutineers (art.12) are not 
mandated to supervise the UST’s concurrence with arts.15 and 16. The Joint 
Reviews under art.13 so far only focussed on the identification procedure for data 
subjects applying for access, deletion or rectification and on the provision of further 
information on the UST’s website with regard to the limits of rectification of data.219 
The national data protection authorities mentioned in arts.15 and 16 merely act as 
postmen, transmitting the applicants’ documents to the UST, helping to translate 
and to verify their identity.220 Thus, the assessment of the requests is solely handled 
by the UST’s Privacy Officer whose decision is subject to administrative redess under 
APA, FOIA and USPA. 
 
However, these redress mechanisms cannot sufficiently remedy the shortcomings 
either. Whilst the right to deletion of unlawfully processed records is not provided 
for, access and amendment lawsuits require a detailed description of the records 
concerned.221 Furthermore, under the USPA, non-EU citizens and residents are still 
excluded from personal scope; for instance, Syrian refugees222  who are particularly 
prone to be affected by the TFTP requests and searches. Generally, however, it 
must be observed that access and rectification can be excluded altogether or the 
burden of proof shifted to the claimant due to far reaching exemptions and 
privileges granted to U.S. law enforcement and security agencies (applicable to the 
UST).223 From a CJEU-perspective, this is not satisfactory: effective remedy must be 
                                                          
218 Supra no.127. 
219 2nd Joint Review Report, supra no.48, 11f.; 3rd Joint Review Report, supra no.51, 17ff.; 
4th Joint Review Report, supra no.54, 16ff. 
220 Letter to LIBE, supra no.7, 5. 
221 FOIA: 5 U.S.C. 552 (3) (A), (B); for USPA see U.S. Department of Justice 
<https://www.justice.gov/opcl/civil-remedies> accessed 07 June 2018. 
222 Korff, supra no.214, at II.ii. 
223 FOIA: 5 U.S.C. 552 (b); USPA: 5 U.S.C. 552a (j) and (k). 
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available to any person irrespective of citizenship as neither arts.7 and 8 EUCFR nor 
art.47 EUCFR are limited in personal scope.224  
 
Furthermore, leaving the data subject with the burden of providing evidence that 
his or her data is processed by the UST without any hold against the agency conflicts 
with the CJEU’s understanding that every person has a right to notification. If 
individuals were informed of the extraction of their personal data, they could seek 
judicial redress more easily. With this argument, the ECtHR considers the right to 
notification dispensable only if access to judicial redress is not dependent on the 
possession of the facts proving or concretely suggesting that the claimant has been 
subjected to secret surveillance.225 The CJEU goes even further and asks for a 
general right to notification. It held that mere transparency clauses obliging the 
data controller to make available general information on the respective programme 
by publication of FAQs on government websites was not sufficient to ensure that 
every person affected can eventually exercise his or her rights to access, 
rectification and redress in order to prevent or remedy data misuse. However, the 
Court acknowledges the risk of jeopardising the investigations carried out by the 
authorities and accepts a pending of notification as long as (absolutely) necessary 
for the achievement of this objective.226 Although this allows for a considerable 
number of derogations, the threshold of necessity is much stricter than mere 
reasonableness227 (as found in art.15 para.2 of the agreement restricting the right 
of access). SWIFT II, however, does not provide for a right to notification at any 
point of data processing. 
 
To sum up, the agreement falls short of providing efficient individual rights to the 
data subjects affected. 
 
3. Extraction from the black box and analysis 
As observed in chapter 1, the extraction process from the black box is not clearly 
portrayed in the agreement and still remains opaque today. The discretion granted 
to the UST for this stage of processing of SWIFT data is at odds with the Court’s 
general considerations on clarity and precision of the legal basis concerned. It will 
                                                          
224 cf. PNR Canada, supra no.10, 226f. 
225 Zakharov, supra no.143, paras.234, 290ff. 
226 PNR Canada, supra no.10, para.218; Tele2, supra no.9, para.121.  
227 Korff, supra no.214, as to the rights of access, administrative and judicial redress under 
the Umbrella-Agreement. 
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be argued that the existent rules on TFTP investigators’ access to the black box 
neither determine the occasions of data usage by the UST in a foreseeable manner 
nor impose efficient safeguards against abuse. Whilst the analysis focusses on art.5 
para.6, the Court’s findings on profiling algorithms are briefly discussed afterwards 
with regard to SWIFT II’s ban on automated processing. 
 
a. Rules governing the access to the black box 
According to the Court, the use of retained personal data must continue to satisfy 
objective criteria establishing a link to the purpose pursued.228 Substantially, access 
should be limited to data of persons who are under reasonable suspicion of criminal 
conduct. Only for national security purposes, access to data of unsuspicious persons 
can be justified if it is likely that the information derived might contribute 
substantially to the success of investigations.229 From a procedural perspective, any 
access requires prior approval by a court or independent administrative body 
following a reasoned request substantiated by sufficient evidence,230 except for 
cases of urgency when an ex post approval is inevitable.231   
 
Substantially, art.5 para.6 stipulating that each individual search ‘shall be narrowly 
tailored, shall demonstrate a reason to believe that the subject of the search has a 
nexus to terrorism or its financing’ does not meet these requirements. Albeit every 
search is conducted on a name or bank account believed to be associated with 
terrorist activity, the vast majority of data subjects whose data are extracted from 
the black box are perfectly innocent. Yet under the assumption that TFTP-searches 
pursue the objective of national security, the level of suspicion with regard to the 
names or bank accounts run against the database and the information provided in 
order to substantiate the terrorism-nexus certainly do not amount to reasonable 
suspicion of terrorist activity. Even if the CJEU might accept a lower threshold,232 
art.5 para.6 neither defines whether ‘a reason to believe’ is to be based on a legal 
or an operational assessment nor does the agreement provide any further 
                                                          
228 Tele2, supra no.9, para.119; PNR Canada, supra no.10, paras.190ff. 
229 Tele2, ibid; the notion of national security is somewhat ambiguous in EU primary law – 
according to the CJEU‘s case law on public security derogations from market freedoms, 
however, the term’s meaning is far narrower than under U.S. law (see E.II). 
230 PNR Canada, supra no.10, paras. 200ff. 
231 Tele2, supra no.9, para.120. 
232 The ECtHR apparently did when it coined the notion of ‘individual suspicion’: Szabó and 
Vissy, supra no.143, para.71. 
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explanation; generally, the wording suggests a very low standard.233 Neither can it 
be derived what is to constitute a nexus to terrorism234 and if a mere remote, purely 
indirect nexus (for example: geographic proximity) is sufficient to run a search on 
the concerned person. Evidently, a terrorism nexus does not necessarily amount to 
terrorist activity as defined in art.2. In combination with the low standard of 
suspicion, art.5 para.6 is hardly suitable to narrow down the searches efficiently. 
The absence of a Human Rights clause aggravates these findings: the UST’s alleged 
practice of taking information from U.S. security lists is not mirrored in the wording 
of the agreement. Here, the prohibition of reliance on any names or supplementary 
information gathered under severe violation of human rights, especially under 
deployment of torture, could prevent the perpetuation of those infringements. Vice 
versa, the agreement lacks a necessary safeguard prohibiting the further use of 
TFTP-derived data for purposes in breach of essential human rights standards, 
especially extrajudicial detention. 235  
 
As to procedural safeguards, the on-site oversight according to art.12 does not 
amount to a general ex ante approval of all the searches run in the black box, nor 
is it entirely clear if it is conducted on legal or operational criteria due to the 
opacity of the access requirements stemming from art.5 paras.5 and 6. Bearing in 
mind the potentially high number of false-positives resulting from a search in 
conformity with the criteria set out in art.5 paras.5 and 6, an a priori review of the 
search requests however seems inevitable in order to prevent any chance of an 
inappropriate search. This ex ante approval might not necessarily require a court 
warrant but must be based on legal criteria and has to be conducted by an 
independent (administrative) body. Supposedly, qualification and seniority of EU 
overseers is similar to the Eminent Person who was appointed to oversee the UST’s 
compliance with the Representations, that is to say judges or lawyers with a special 
background in counter-terrorism. However, this assumption cannot be derived from 
the agreement’s wording; since they team-up with the so-called SWIFT scrutineers 
whose background is not known at all, the agreement does not require an 
assessment comparable to judicial approval. 
                                                          
233 Michael Palmisano, ‘The Surveillance Cold War: Recent Decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights and their Application to Mass Surveillance in the United States and Russia’ 
(2017) 20 Gouzaga JInt’l L 75, 81. 
234Amicelle, supra no.69, 21. 
235 For the whole paragraph, by analogy: Korff, supra no.214, at II.ii. 
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Consequently, arts.5 and 12 do not provide sufficient substantial and procedural 
safeguards ensuring the use of SWIFT data is compliant with arts.7 and 8 EUCFR. 
 
b. Extraction and analysis of SWIFT networks 
With its deliberations on automated processing, the PNR Canada opinion breaks legal 
ground beyond the well-established guarantee that no adverse decision shall be 
taken on the basis of automated data analysis only. Whilst the Court accepts the 
need for a computer-based analysis of mass data, it requires sufficient safeguards 
hedging the increased risks coming with automated analysis. Since the interference 
with arts.7 and 8 EUCFR essentially depends on the algorithms applied, the pre-
established models and criteria should be specific, reliable and non-discriminatory, 
eventually arriving at results amounting to reasonable suspicion. Data-bases used 
for cross-checking, on the other hand, should serve the same objectives as the 
automated data analysis and provide high reliability and up-to-date information. 
Here, the Court tolerates soft-oversight mechanisms in the course of joint 
reviews.236  
 
It cannot be answered here if the technique of link analysis deployed by the TFTP 
and the external databases consulted therefore satisfy these requirements. In light 
of the findings of chapter 1, however, the agreement’s ban on automated processing 
in art.5 para.3 is at odds with the Court’s general considerations on legal clarity 
and instead should comprise a clause prohibiting the UST, or any other authority 
provided with TFTP-derived data, from taking any decision affecting the person 
concerned solely on the basis of automated analysis. Furthermore, art.13 
apparently excludes the methods of analysis applied by the TFTP from the Joint 
Review and thereby leaves it to the exclusive discretion of the UST if the number 
of links constituting a network, the algorithms applied in order to qualify the 
network and the databases consulted are appropriate to the common objective 
pursued. Thereby, it clearly fails to comply with the requirements set forth by the 
Court. 
 
4. Dissemination of leads 
As acknowledged by the ECtHR lately, data sharing is a useful tool for purposes of 
international cooperation in combatting terrorism.237 This is mirrored in SWIFT II’s 
                                                          
236 PNR Canada, supra no.10, paras.168ff. 
237 Szabó, supra no.143, para.78. 
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provisions on reciprocity and onward transfer. Whilst it already has been pointed 
out in chapter 1 that the agreement does not specify whether the information, leads 
and reports disseminated contain raw SWIFT data, extracted networks, mere names 
or threat analyses on identified terrorism suspects, the safeguards provided for data 
sharing miss the high standards stipulated by the CJEU: 
The Court clearly identifies the loss of control on personal data as being the major 
risk of data sharing with third parties.  In order to ensure minimal safeguards for 
data that is disclosed to third country authorities, an adequate level of data 
protection must be ensured. This either requires an adequacy decision issued by the 
Commission or a specific agreement with the third country authority receiving the 
data. However, any discretionary power of the disseminating authority as to 
adequate protection and urgency procedures must be ruled out.238  
 
As opposed to this case law, art.7 on onward transfers does not require the existence 
of an adequate level of protection offered by the third country to where the data 
is transferred; theoretically, the UST could share personal data with every authority 
mandated with counter-terrorism as it pleases, that is to say in particular with 
intelligence services of third countries. This is particularly problematic in light of 
the absence of a Human Rights clause.239 The reservation of prior EU consent is 
limited to the case in which personal data of EU citizens or residents is involved, 
despite arts.7 and 8 CFR granting protection to every person when his or her 
personal SWIFT data is transferred from the EU to a third country. Moreover, in 
cases of immediate threat or existing protocols, consent is not required at all and 
the UST must merely notify the dissemination afterwards. Whilst the Court pointed 
out that notification must be provided to every data subject individually,240 SWIFT 
II lacks a provision on notification altogether.  
 
Remarkably, the UST has so far relied on existing protocols for all transfers to third 
countries.241 However, it is not clear which protocols are referred to and if they 
establish similar safeguards as an EU-third country agreement on data sharing for 
law enforcement purposes; in fact, is is questionable if those protocols could 
                                                          
238 PNR Canada, supra no.10, paras.213f. 
239 Korff, supra no.214, at II.i. 
240 Supra no.226. 
241 2nd Joint Review Report, supra no.48, 23; 3rd Joint Review Report, supra no.51, 26; 4th 
Joint Review Report, supra no.54, 26. 
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constitute a legal basis in the understanding of the CJEU at all.242 Furthermore, 
after the annulment of Safe Harbour and before the EU-U.S. Umbrella Agreement 
entered into force in 2017, it could not be assumed that other U.S. law enforcement 
agencies and counter terrorism authorities ensured adequacy either. When it comes 
to international organisations, it is entirely in the UST’s discretion if those, for 
instance Interpol, ensure an adequate level of protection. Art.7 lit.e, requiring the 
UST to oblige the third party to delete the information as soon as no longer 
necessary for the purpose it was shared for, does not remedy these weaknesses 
because of the lack of enforcement capacities on behalf of the UST or the EU.  
 
Turning to the reciprocity mechanism, it is questionable which rules exactly apply 
to the Member States’ authorities, Eurojust and Europol requesting searches by the 
UST. Art.10 does not refer to art.5 paras.5 and 6; instead, the enumerated 
institutions shall ‘determine’ if there is a reason to believe that a person has a nexus 
to terrorism. The notions of reasonable belief and terrorism nexus might be 
interpreted differently from Member State to Member State as the agreement does 
not lay down sufficiently clearly what is meant therewith. Furthermore, when TFTP-
derived information is shared with EU and Member States’ institutions under arts.9 
and 10, it will probably be shielded entirely from any legal or democratic oversight 
due to the UST’s classification practice; thus, access is restricted despite the fact 
that, at least in case of art.10, potentially all data processed (including the raw 
SWIFT data and the information provided to substantiate the requests) originates 
from Europe.  
 
To conclude, SWIFT II does not lay down sufficiently clear and precise rules 
regarding the data shared with EU and Member States’ institutions nor does it 
establish efficient safeguards for ensuring an adequate level of protection when it 
comes to third country authorities. 
 
III. No adequate level of data protection under SWIFT II 
The above examination of the SWIFT II Agreement demonstrates the lack of 
adequate protection provided by the UST contrary to the adequacy statement of 
art.8. It has been shown that every stage of data processing displays severe 
deficiencies in the protection of privacy and personal data: (1) The transfer of SWIFT 
                                                          
242 Korff, supra no.214, at II.iii. 
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data from European territory to the UST is not governed by clear and precise rules 
regarding the concerned data categories, lacks safeguards for sensitive data as well 
as data subject to professional secrecy and is neither placed under independent and 
efficient oversight. (2) The retention period for unextracted data is not based on 
objective criteria whilst the agreement fails to lay down sufficiently clear and 
precise rules on the retention and deletion of extracted data from the black box; 
furthermore, individual rights to access, rectification, deletion and redress are 
rendered ineffective by indefinite derogation clauses and overly restrictive 
interpretation on behalf of the UST. (3) As to the use of SWIFT data by the UST, the 
agreement does neither clearly define the threshold for accessing the black box nor 
does it impose sufficient restrictions and oversight on the analysis of the extracted 
data. (4) When it comes to the dissemination of TFTP-derived information, it is not 
clear exactly which personal data can be shared with third parties, nor is the 
disclosure accompanied with sufficient safeguards ensuring an adequate level of 
data protection. (5) SWIFT II finally does not comprise a right to notification of data 
subjects. 
 
However, art.8 constitutes a de facto adequacy decision243 with the consequence 
that neither SWIFT nor European Data Protection Authorities nor affected data 
subjects can refuse data transfer to the U.S. unless the decision is withdrawn or 
invalidated. As opposed to ‘ordinary’ adequacy decisions issued by the Commission 
(as in the Schrems case), the provision of art.8 contained in an international 
agreement is hardly impugnable for its legal superiority to EU secondary law.244  
 
From that angle, it is remarkable that SWIFT II was cited as an example for 
extraterritorial application of EU law245 and as ‘an improvement’ due to the 
Parliament’s persistence.246 In the cold light of day, the agreement rather appears 
to be a Pyrrhic victory, keeping the EU in a position of a ‘norm taker’ of U.S. 
interests.247 If an EU TFTS would remedy that situation and how it could be designed 
to meet the requirements of CJEU case law shall be answered in the next chapter. 
                                                          
243 By analogy: EP Legal Service, Legal Opinion on EU-US Umbrella agreement concerning 
the protection of personal data and cooperation between law enforcement authorities in 
the EU and the US, Doc.no. SJ-0784/15 (2016), paras.17ff. 
244 Ibid, 21ff. 
245 Inter alia: Yuko Suda, ‘Transatlantic Politics of Data Transfer: Extraterritoriality, 
Counter-Extraterritoriality and Counter-Terrorism’ (2013) 51 JCMS 772, 781.  
246 Rapporteur Alvaro in: LIBE, supra no.40. 
247 Very fiercly so: Kierkegaard, supra no.7; by analogy to the PNR Agreement: Javier 
Argomaniz, ‘The Passenger Name Records Agreement and the European Union 
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Internalisation of U.S. Border Security Norms’ (2009) 31 Journal of European Integration 
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D. Chapter 3: SWIFT III – the EU TFTS coordination and analytical service? 
Turning to a future EU TFTS, this chapter departs from the current agreement’s 
provision on an ‘equivalent EU system’ intended to substitute bulk transfers with 
pre-filtered data subsets. On the basis of EU Commission preparatory publications, 
it will be shown that the EU again performed a U-turn, suddenly calling for a system 
complementary to SWIFT II. Even more ambitious than a substitutional scheme, the 
design of an EU TFTS running parallel to the SWIFT II cooperation must fit into the 
strengthened EU data protection framework of 2016. Although it does not seem 
inaccordable with the standards set out by the CJEU, both the U.S. and European 
data protection watchdogs will have strong reservations as to the scheme’s 
compliance with their respective interests. 
 
I. Art.11 SWIFT II as a manifestation of EU fundamental rights commitment 
Together with the exclusion of SEPA-data from UST requests, art.11 of the current 
agreement was perceived as the major negotiation success on behalf of the 
Parliament.248 It was the Parliamentarians’ desire to replace the transmission of 
mass SWIFT data with a system allowing the extraction of individual datasets on 
European territory and to provide the UST therewith. Bulk transfers should remain 
only a preliminary but necessary evil until fundamental rights compliance could be 
restored in course of custom-building counter-terrorism capacities in the near 
future. 249 The U.S. committed to support and cooperate on an equivalent EU system 
(para.2) and the Commission was tasked to carry out a feasibility study as soon as 
possible (para.1). The outcome was however rather biased: 
In a preliminary paper from 2011, models of hybrid EU and national cooperation 
were assessed as preferable policy options compared to fully centralised or fully 
decentralised systems. The reason was threefold: to run the system successfully, 
input of national intelligence was deemed essential; on the other hand, only a 
centralised European unit was assumed suitable both to effectively ‘connect the 
dots’ across inner-European borders and to secure a strict and uniform 
implementation of European data protection standards.250 In the Commission’s final 
communication from 2013, a so-called ‘EU TFTS coordination and analytical service’ 
was understood to be the most advantageous as well as highly centralised hybrid 
                                                          
248 Marieke de Goede, ‘The SWIFT Affair and the Global Politics of European Security’ 
(2012) 50 JCMS 214, 224f. 
249 For this and the previous: Wesseling (2016), supra no.12, 11. 
250 For this and the previous: Commission, A European terrorist finance tracking system: 
available options COM(2011) 429 final, 4ff. 
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model.251 In this scenario, a central TFTS unit at EU level, preferably situated at 
Europol, would be tasked with the collection, retention, extraction and analysis of 
SWIFT data. Member States could opt to either request searches to be run on their 
behalf or conduct their own searches in the database.252  
 
Eventually, the Commission refrained from putting forward a legislative proposal. 
Compared to maintaining SWIFT II, they came to the conclusion that it was difficult 
to justify the added value of an EU TFTS. On the one hand, an EU TFTS would still 
provoke considerable fundamental rights challenges; on the other, any system was 
estimated as highly cost-intensive. Moreover, Member States’ law enforcement 
agencies were increasingly making use on the reciprocity mechanism and apparently 
lost interest in substituting SWIFT II with a European system.253  
 
II. From ambition to reality: The call for a ‘genuine Security Union’  
From 2015 on, numerous terrorist atrocities on European soil have urged the EU to 
‘do everything necessary to support the Member States in ensuring internal security 
and fighting terrorism’. 254 The Commission delivered an agenda for building up an 
‘effective and genuine Security Union’ in line with the Stockholm and Post 
Stockholm Programme in order to enhance the internal security of the European 
Union and its Member States.255  
 
In the Commission’s counter-terrorism strategy, combatting terrorist financing 
continues to be a priority of which the EU-US TFTP mechanism forms an important 
part. After Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, EU requests under the reciprocity clause 
immediately doubled and kept rising.256 Moreover, it transpired that on the eve of 
the assaults, most attackers were known to national law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies but neither their expenditures nor their movements across 
Europe came to light due to a lack of intelligence sharing.257 The ‘SEPA-gap’ of 
                                                          
251 2013 TFTS Study, supra no.5, 19ff. 
252 For this and the previous: 2011 TFTS preliminary study, supra no.250, 9f. 
253 For the entire paragraph: 2013 TFTS Study,supra no.5, 34. 
254 European Council, Bratislava Declaration (16 September 2016) Decl. 517/16. 
255 Commission, European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way 
towards an effective and genuine Security Union COM (2016) 230 final. 
256 Supra no.123. 
257 Cf. Commission, Roadmap: A possible European system complementing the existing EU-
US TFTP agreement (2016) <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_home_191_system_complementing_tftp__en.pdf> 
accessed 07 June 2018.  
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SWIFT II apparently had turned into a security risk; after the Brussels bombings in 
March 2016, conservative MEPs supported the Commission’s idea of a 
‘complementary’ EU TFTS.258 A reconsideration of available options was announced 
for December 2016. However, the goal was no longer to replace the current SWIFT 
II scheme but to run a parallel system on European financial messages.259 The 
publication has been continually postponed. Irrespective of the outcome, the EU 
already has made another remarkable U-turn in the SWIFT-affair. 
 
III. Main drivers for a complementary system 
Notwithstanding the reassessment’s objective of identifying available options, it can 
be assumed that the reasons for excluding purely national as well as purely 
centralised models are still valid. Moreover, among the hybrid options preferred in 
2013,260 a centralised unit tasked with requesting, collecting, searching and 
analysing the data promises exactly what has been missing on the European level so 
far, which is reliable information sharing. However, back in 2013, the Commission 
had already pointed out that the U.S. TFTP mechanism did ‘not fully represent EU 
interests’.261 There are four main drivers which continue to be decisive in tailoring 
a European-oriented system: 
 
1. SEPA-data and other financial services 
In the course of the analysis of the 2015 and 2016 attacks launched in Europe, 
planning and effectuating terrorist plots proved by no means as cost intensive as 
9/11 had been; hardly any international money transfers of a significant amount 
were necessary beforehand.262 Hence the main purpose of an EU TFTS will be the 
closure of the SEPA-gap arising from art.4 para.2 lit.d SWIFT II. As early as 2011, it 
was considered reaching beyond SWIFT and including other European financial 
services into the list of designated providers.263 Since SWIFT communications in SEPA 
standard amount only to a small percentage of all payments denominated in Euros, 
                                                          
258 EU Parliament Plenary Verbatim Record (12 April 2016) P8_CRE-REV(2016)04-12 (9), 
contribution of MEP Weber: ‘And we need more. […] We have no TFTP in the European 
Union. […] We need more commitment on this.’ 
259 For this and the previous: 2016 Action Plan, supra no.6. 
260 Besides the ‘coordination and analytical service’, the Commission had presented the 
option of an ‘extraction service’ lacking analytical capacities and an upgrade of the 
Financial Intelligence Unit Platform responsible for merely issuing requests to the 
Designated Providers: 2013 TFTS Study, supra no.5, 14ff. 
261 Ibid, 6. 
262 Cf. Supra no.257. 
263 2011 TFTS preliminary study, supra no.250, 7f. 
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(Pan)European automated clearing houses, domestic in-house payment systems and 
e-money businesses (to mention but a few examples) could be added to the scope 
of an EU TFTS, in order to provide law enforcement services with a more 
comprehensive picture of money flow.264 However, this would lead to a considerable 
growth of the amount of data collected and could push the system over the edge of 
operability.265 Moreover, the inclusion of further services would require 
considerable data cleansing efforts, whereas it is the high standardisation of the 
SWIFT-datasets that makes them highly accessible for search, retrieval and analysis. 
In any case, the expansion of collected data to further providers would go hand in 
hand with a significant increase in costs. 266 
 
2. Terrorism and other criminal offences 
Whilst the TFTP’s purpose is strictly limited to counter-terrorism, the Commission 
had already considered an expansion to other forms of organised crime in 2013 since 
different forms of criminality often go hand in hand.267 In fact, most perpetrators 
in Europe had criminal records, inter alia in drugs dealing, robbery and counterfeit-
trading. Experts therefore recommend widening financial monitoring to an ‘all-
streams approach’, 268 including petty crime along with organised crime.269 
However, apart from massive implications for the compliance with fundamental 
rights resulting from a broader approach, this would also cause a series of rather 
technical problems: the TFTP is designed to map terrorist networks instead of 
‘ordinary’ crime structures; it remains to be seen if the UST can provide the EU with 
the necessary know-how. Even if such a capacity building on behalf of the EU was 
deemed desirable and feasible, this could undermine the complementarity with the 
TFTP.270 
                                                          
264 2013 TFTS Study, supra no.5, 6, 37; Wesseling (2016), supra no.12, 14f. 
265 Remarkably, the vast amount of data to be collected served as an argument against the 
establishment of a centralised EU PNRS because of the high possibility of system crashes, 
24/7 operation and a lack of expertise on Union level: Commission, Impact Assessment 
accompanying the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the use of 
Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution 
of terrorist offences and serious crime (Staff Working Paper) SEC (2011) 132 final, 31. 
266 For this and the previous: supra no.257. 
267 2013 TFTS Study, supra no.5, 35.  
268 Rajan Basra et al, ‘Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New 
Crime-Terror Nexus’ (ICSR 2016), 48. 
269 Florence Gaub and Julia Lisiecka, ‘The crime-terrorism nexus’, EUISS Brief Issue 
10/2017. 
270 Ibid. 
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3. Europol’s enhanced role in counter-terrorism 
The Commission had pointed out that the most convenient, smooth and expeditious 
implementation of an EU TFTS should be secured within existing structures on the 
EU level.271 Experienced in cooperation with the UST and hosting the EU Counter-
Terrorism Centre, Europol arguably is the best equipped Union agency to be tasked 
with the EU TFTS coordination and analytical service. Conversely, Europol could 
benefit from being commissioned with operating the EU TFTS. The agency was often 
criticised as hardly living up to its mandate as an information hub because it could 
not provide assistance to the Member States with analysis based on original 
intelligence. The reason for this was depicted as ‘Europol’s chicken-egg-
dilemma’272: since Europol only has the authority and capability of collecting 
intelligence from open sources, it relies on national agencies’ goodwill to share 
their raw data and intelligence at European level.273 However, national counter-
terrorism agencies proved particularly reluctant to share their intelligence at all, 
on the one hand because of the sensitivity of the information for the Member States’ 
national security, on the other because of a lack of trust.274 The new Europol 
Regulation has strengthened Europol’s position considerably by obliging the Member 
States to provide personal data and information to Europol’s databases (art.7 paras. 
6f., recital 13). 275 Additionally, awarding Europol with the task of collecting and 
analysing European financial messaging data could mitigate the (continuing) 
dilemma of national agencies being both Europol’s provider and customer of 
intelligence:  so far, no Member State has built up the necessary capacities to 
monitor financial transactions on a large scale; the prospect of being provided with 
original financial intelligence from Europol could serve as an incentive for the 
Member States’ counter-terrorism agencies to share further data with Europol and 
finally upgrade the agency to an equal partner in counter-terrorism. 
 
                                                          
271 2011 TFTS preliminary study, supra no.250, 6. 
272 Oldrich Bures, ‘Europol’s Counter-terrorism Role: A Chicken-Egg Dilemma’ in Christian 
Kaunert and Sarah Léonard (eds), European Security, Terrorism and Intelligence: Tackling 
New Security Challenges in Europe (Palgrave Macmillan 2013), 65ff. 
273 Björn Müller-Wille, ‘The Effect of International Terrorism on EU Intelligence Co-
operation’ (2008) 46 JCMS 49, 54ff. 
274 ibid; John D. Occhipinti, ‘Still Moving Toward a European FBI? Re-Examining the Politics 
of EU Police Cooperation’ (2015) 30 Intelligence and National Security 234, 245f.  
275 According to Europol’s 2017 Activity Report, the database activity increased 
significantly: Europol, 2017 Consolidated Annual Activity Report (Public Version 2018), 
16ff. 
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4. Ensuring U.S. support 
Finally, a crucial point for building up the capacities for an EU TFTS is U.S. support 
with knowledge and experience. This might come at the cost of significant 
compromises. Two main conditions of U.S. cooperation in matters of a European 
equivalent are, firstly, that any European system would not require substantial 
alterations of the SWIFT II Agreement and, secondly, that the EU TFTS would allow 
for efficient and expeditous data sharing by way of a reciprocity mechanism.276 
Whether reciprocity with the U.S. can be secured by a provision similar to art.9 and 
10 SWIFT II or if the U.S. will insist on direct access to the system (for instance 
through on-site U.S. officials) remains to be seen. However, the mere reluctance of 
the U.S. to adjust the current agreement – in contradiction to their commitment 
under art.11 – is the final nail in the coffin of the EU TFTS’ original purpose of ending 
bulk transfers to the UST. 
 
IV. Drafting an EU TFTS  
In light of the foregoing and the observations of chapter 2, the following paragraphs 
will depict a draft EU TFTS coordination and analytical service in compliance with 
European case law. If the system were to be run by Europol, it should fit into the 
data processing provisions contained in the new Europol-Regulation and, as far as 
Member States are concerned, comply with the new Data Protection Directive for 
law enforcement purposes. 
 
As pointed out by Wesseling, any proposal for an EU TFTS must answer the following 
legal questions:277 
Would the establishment of an EU TFTS end up in blanket data retention, that is to 
say mass surveillance? 
Is an EU TFTS necessary and proportionate as to:  
- the alternative of merely strengthening existing schemes of financial 
intelligence cooperation in the EU?  
- the problem of technically narrowing down data requests and transfers from 
the designated providers? 
- the inclusion of criminal offences beyond terrorism and terrorist financing? 
 
                                                          
276 Wesseling (2016), supra no.12, 16. 
277 Ibid, 23ff. 
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Would an EU TFTS be liable to different layers of oversight and how can democratic 
and judicial oversight be ensured in particular? Can the oversight bodies effectively 
support affected individuals in enforcing their fundamental rights? 
 
The next paragraphs will answer these questions according to the stages of data 
processing as found in chapter 1 and 2. However, this thesis’ scope is still limited 
to a rough draft of a possible EU system and cannot achieve the detail of a feasibilty 
study, let alone a legislative proposal. Therefore, where questions remain open, it 
will be pointed out.  
 
1. Requests for financial messaging data 
In any event, the Europol TFTS Unit must have the authority to issue legally binding 
requests to the designated data providers278 in order to ensure a constant and 
reliable supply of data to the searchable data base. Otherwise, data retrieval would 
not only depend on the Member States’ willingness to provide financial data to 
Europol but also on 27 different law enforcement and data protection regimes 
(irrespective of the harmonisations introduced by the Data Protection Directive). 
Consequently, Europol is to be regarded as the data controller responsible for the 
compliance with data protection safeguards. 
 
An extension of the requests to other designated providers and to purely national 
transfers is particularly problematic with regard to the CJEU’s findings in Digital 
Rights Ireland and Tele2 Sverige as to the incompatibility of arts.7 and 8 EUCFR 
with blanket data collection for preventive purposes: effectively, every personal 
activity accompanied by money transfers could be subjected to monitoring,  thus 
interfering with the right to privacy and data protection of – potentially – the entire 
European population. This would go beyond even what the General Data Retention 
Directive would have provided for since the financial activities liable to collection 
do not necessarily coincide with a communication between different persons. 
However, as it cannot be assumed that other financial messaging providers have 
implemented into their systems the functionality of targeted searches, the requests 
would identically end up in bulk transfers to Europol, despite utmost diligence in 
narrowing down the requests’ substantial scope.279 Still, the majority of datasets 
                                                          
278 Necessary amendments of the Europol Regulation are discussed in chapter 4 (E.). 
279 The preparation of threat assessments, strategic analyses and general situation reports 
is one of Europol’s core competences under the Regulation (art.4 para.1 lit.f, art.18 
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would belong to entirely unsuspicious persons. This is at odds with the rulings of the 
Court. Thus, an EU TFTS should be limited either to (European) cross-border money 
flows or to financial communications sent through SWIFT’s network (including those 
of national clearing houses who use SWIFT’s network and standard for their 
purposes).  
 
As to the inclusion of further criminal offences, the severe interference coming with 
the data collection described in the previous paragraph requires a high level of 
justification. Counter-terrorism being the objective pursued, any criminal conduct 
targeted with the requests must typically accompany the financing of terrorism. 
Whilst this does not necessarily rule out low-level and petty crimes in the first place, 
any such offence must be committed within or contribute to a terrorist structure, 
that is to say display a more or less organised character. Otherwise, the core 
approach of mapping terrorist networks in order to identify so-far unknown 
terrorism suspects could be undermined, possibly prompting the Court to question 
the measures’ coherence. It shall not be suggested here which criminal offences 
meet these criteria. The EU TFTS’ legal basis, however, must lay down precisely the 
criminal conduct that establishes ‘a terrorism nexus’ and that can be targeted with 
the data requests (and the searches respectively).280  
 
With regard to the necessary safeguards, the Europol Regulation already provides 
for an increased protection of affected persons. Art.30 imposes restrictions on the 
processing of sensitive data (para.2), particularly obligating Europol to transparency 
(para.6, art.31 para.3).281 However, rules on the processing of data concerning the 
client-attorney-privilege are absent. Furthermore, it is still questionable if such 
data is necessary at all for the purposes of the TFTS and if processing could be 
entirely prevented (as in art.13 para.4 EUPNR Directive). The EU TFTS legal basis 
therefore should comprise a provision on the handling of sensitive data, in particular 
regarding data security and automated processing (first and foremost: a prohibition 
of automated racial profiling).282  
                                                          
para.2 lit.b, c); thus, the agency should be sufficiently equipped to collate the requests 
with geographical risk and threat information. 
280 Cf. DRI, supra no.9, para.60.  
281 However, it provides for less safeguards than Directive (EU) 2016/680: Céline C. Cocq, 
‘EU Data Protection Rules Applying to Law Enforcement Activities: Towards an Harmonised 
Legal Framework?’ (2016) 7 NJECL 263, 268f. 
282 Art.30 para.4 Europol Regulation remains rather superficial as to automated profiling in 
comparison to art.11 paras.2 and 3 Directive (EU) 2016/680. 
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Additionally, the Regulation establishes a comprehensive oversight procedure under 
the responsibility of the EDPS. Being vested with far reaching powers,283 inter alia 
to advise Europol in cases of individual rights violations and to eventually impose a 
ban on processing activities (art.43 para.3), the EDPS can ensure that his or her 
legal opinion as to the validity of the requests will prevail. To the benefit of affected 
data subjects, the EDPS is also mandated with the handling of individual complaints. 
For the complaint to the EDPS and further judicial redress (to the CJEU, art.48), 
data subjects are not required to provide evidence of their victim status in cases of 
secret surveillance (here: the fact that Europol’s requests result in the collection 
of the applicant’s data).284 
 
However, ex ante oversight is limited to the consultation procedure of art.39 when 
the introduction of new data processing activities depends on the EDPS’ prior 
consent. Thus, an approval mechanism with regard to the requests still has to be 
implemented. Since the EDPS is predominantly focussed on ex post supervision, the 
authority of monthly pre-approving Europol requests would entirely change the 
system of oversight and possibly overstretch the EDPS’ mandate. Preferably, a 
different oversight body could be tasked with ex ante assessment; if so, this body 
has to provide for sufficient independence of the law enforcement community in 
general and Europol in particular and to ensure a legal assessment of the requests 
as much as an expeditious procedure. Although Eurojust was suggested to be a more 
suitable oversight body than Europol for purposes of SWIFT II,285 it remains 
questionable if the agency responsible for the enhancement of transnational 
criminal prosecution can be regarded as sufficiently impartial to supervise Europol. 
Generally, Eurojust and Europol established an intense and complex cooperation in 
                                                          
283 The mandate of the EDPS and the provision of intrusive investigative powers was 
criticised conflicting with the EDPS’ lack of experience in the field of law enforcement and 
the need for flexibility in data processing for Europol’s purposes: Cristina Blasi Casagran, 
‘The New Europol Legal Framework: Implications for EU Exchanges of Information in the 
Field of Law Enforcement’, in: Maria O’Neill and Ken Swinton (eds.), Challenges and 
Critiques of the EU Internal Security Strategy (Cambridge Scholars 2017), 149, 164; in this 
respect, the Regulation goes far beyond the Directive (EU) 2016/680, the latter leaving 
utmost discretion to the Member States as to the appropriate powers awarded to data 
protection authorities. 
284 Maria Tzanou, ‘European Regulation of Transatlantic Data Transfers and Online 
Surveillance’ (2017) 17 HRLR 545, 550 with reference to Schrems, supra no.9, para.87, 
DRI, supra no.9, para.33 and Joined Cases C 465/00, C 138/01 and C 139/01 
Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others [2003] ECR I-4989, para.75; Valsamis Mitsilegas, 
‘Surveillance and Digital Privacy’ (2016) 47 Colum HRLR 1, 20f, 23f. 
285 Letter to LIBE, supra no.7, Attachment p.5. 
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criminal matters,286 whilst in particular, Eurojust is also eligible to data requests to 
the U.S. under art.10 SWIFT II and might come into conflict of interest when 
approving production orders. What is left are (judicial) warrants issued by national 
courts, for instance where the designated providers are based. Whether this is a 
feasible solution cannot be answered here. However, it appears compliant with the 
Court’s case law to merely impose judicial oversight ahead of access to the datasets 
collected as long as the safeguards for the retention of requested data are 
sufficiently robust.287 
 
2. Data retention: the EU TFTS black box 
Within a short period of time, an enormous amount of personal data can be expected 
to be transferred from the designated providers’ systems directly to the searchable 
database. Similar to its U.S. counterpart, Europol therefore must provide for a 
secure environment, in particular ensuring data integrity. However, this must not 
conflict with individual rights to access, rectification, deletion and blocking.  
 
Data integrity and security being a core principle of the Europol Regulation (art.28 
para.1 lit.f), Europol is obliged to implement appropriate technical and 
organisational safeguards in order to prevent data from unlawful access, 
destruction, dissemination or alteration (art.32); the sub-guarantees listed in art.32 
para.2 are comprehensive, their design has to enhance oversight and the protection 
of individual rights in particular (‘privacy by design’, art.33).288 Moreover, whilst 
art.39 requires the EDPS’ placet to the technical and organisational measures before 
the system goes operational, the maintenance of protocols and documentation of 
automated processing activities according to art.40 enables the EDPS to 
meticulously trace back every activity in the database for a period of three years. 
In case of security breaches, Europol is obliged to proactively provide information 
                                                          
286 Anne Weyemberg et al, ‘Competition or Cooperation? State of Play and Future 
Perspectives on the Relations Between Europol, Eurojust and the European Judicial 
Network’ (2015) 6 NJECL 258, 267ff. 
287 Dissenting: EDPS, EDPS comments on the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council on a European Terrorist Finance Tracking System 
(TFTS) and on the Commission Staff Working Document - Impact Assessment accompanying 
the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on a 
European Terrorist Finance Tracking System (TFTS) (2014) 
<https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/14-04-17_tfts_comments_en.pdf> 
accessed 23 June 2018. 
288 Still, with regard to the concept of privacy by design, the Regulation fails to further 
indicate the technical and organisational requirements and remains rather opaque: 
Casagran, supra no.283, 165ff. 
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to the EDPS, the national data protection authorities and the affected individuals 
(arts.34 and 35). Thus, with regards to data integrity and security, the Regulation 
provides for a satisfactory level of protection. 
 
However, despite the new Europol Regulation introducing the model of integrated 
data management departing from Europol’s previous data bases and files in order 
to achieve increased interoperability and availability,289 for purposes of the EU 
TFTS, the U.S. approach of a stand-alone database should be maintained. Here, 
costs could be reduced by involving the European Agency for the operational 
management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice 
(‘eu LISA’) in the maintenance of the database on behalf of Europol. eu LISA was 
established with the mandate to administer the major European databases VIS, SIS 
II and EURODAC without having the authority to operate the systems under any 
circumstances.290 eu LISA’s strict data protection regime could thus add another 
layer of protection to the data stored in the ‘TFTS black box’. 
 
Still, in the Court’s view, the length of the data retention period is decisive for the 
severity of the interference with arts.7 and 8 EUCFR. Art.31 of the Regulation 
provides for an average retention of three years and an option of prolongation up 
to six years (and beyond) in case of substantiated necessity (to be documented). 
Despite art.31 para.3 imposing increased oversight on the storage of sensitive data 
and art.31 para.6 deliminating any alternative to deletion to exactly numerated 
cases, a blanket retention for a period of three years is likely to come in conflict 
with the Court’s requirements on the sufficient link between the data subjects 
concerned and the objective pursued when data are retained irrespective of initial 
suspicion.  In this regard, the model laid down in the EU PNR Directive291 obliging 
the involved agencies to gradually depersonalise the datasets might serve as a 
suitable safeguard.292 Thus, Europol could handle datasets according to their status 
                                                          
289 As to the advantages and pitfalls coming with this structural change, see: F. Coudert, 
‘The Europol Regulation and Purpose Limitation: From the “Silo-Based Approach“ to… 
What Exactly?’ (2017) 3 EDPL 313ff. 
290 Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
October 2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-
scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (2011) OJ L 286/1. 
291 Supra no.59, art.12. 
292 However, the EDPS raised concerns as to appropriateness and necessity of the five year 
retention period found in the EUPNR Directive (despite masking of datasets): Opinion 
5/2015, <https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/15-09-24_pnr_en.pdf>  
accessed 01 May 2018, para.24. 
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of suspicion (which is a general obligation under art.30 para.1 of the Regulation). 
As to personal data accessed that could not confirm any suspicion whatsoever, the 
consequence must be the deletion from the database which is to be secured by 
appropriate technical and organisational measures according to arts.32 and 33. 
Currently, the rights of data subjects are tailored for Europol’s established 
informational structure building on data transfers from the Member States, 
presupposing that the individual will apply for access, rectification or erasure on a 
national level (art.37). Thus, the legal basis of an EU TFTS has to provide for 
individual rights directly against Europol as data controller; arts.12 to 16 of 
Directive (EU) 2016/680 could serve as suitable model for this purpose, including 
the right to notification (art.13 para.2) and respective derogation clauses (in order 
to avoid obstruction or prejudice of national law enforcement inquiries, 
investigations and proceedings and to protect national and public security: arts.13 
para.3, 15, 16 para.4).293 In any case, the EDPS will have oversight on Europol’s 
handling of applications (art.43 para.2 lit.c) and decide upon respective complaints 
(art.43 para.2 lit.a, art.47) in cooperation with the national data protection 
authorities with regard to the interpretation of the derogation clauses (art.44f.).  
 
3. Extraction and analysis 
According to the 2013 TFTS study, searches to extract data from the database shall 
be conducted by Europol and Member State representatives alike. Due to the strict 
security requirements, remote access is to be avoided. Consequently, trained 
Europol staff and seconded national officals must operate the database on-site (cf. 
art.6 para.8 EUPNR Directive). The extraction process will most likely be based on 
the U.S. search-and-retrieval software especially designed for TFTP purposes, that 
is to say that searches can only be run on individual names or account numbers.  
 
Before a search can be initiated, the investigators have to substantiate suspicion of 
the targeted person committing or preparing one of the offences liable to the EU 
TFTS scheme. Whether the threshold necessarily requires reasonable suspicion 
might be doubted in light of the ECtHR’s decision in Szabó and Vissy, whereas for 
purposes of counter-terrorism ‘individual suspicion’ can be regarded as a 
                                                          
293 Although the derogation clauses under Directive (EU) 2016/680 are criticised for their 
broadness, their application is guided by the principle of proportionality which is not 
expressly mirrored in the Europol Regulation: Cocq, supra no.281, 272f.; furthermore, the 
CJEU’s understanding of ‘public security’ is comparatively restrictive: Case C-145/09 Land 
Baden-Württemberg v Panagiotis Tsakouridis (2010) ECLI:EU:C:2010:708, paras.39ff. 
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satisfactory safeguard.294 However, since the notion of ‘individual suspicion’ is not 
clear as to its meaning, the legal basis should spell out what is to be understood 
therewith. In that regard, ex ante judicial approval of the searches seems 
particularly desireable in order to ensure a profound legal interpretation of the 
access requirements. At this stage of processing, the individuals and bank accounts 
targeted can be attributed to the national jurisdiction of a Member State and judges 
can assess the requests on the basis of concrete information provided for 
substantiation. However, it might be practicable to allocate jurisdiction to a 
singular national court.  In any case, the EDPS and the national data protection 
authorities will conduct ex post oversight on the implementation in practice. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the EDPS under the Regulation is granted far more 
powers than most national data protection authorities295 might hamper the uniform 
implementation of the advice given. Again, this demonstrates the necessity of ex 
ante judicial approval of every search conducted in the database. 
 
Data extracted will finally be analysed by Europol and national counter-terrorism 
experts. For this purpose, on-site presence is not necessary, albeit the transfer of 
the raw networks alone might lead to bulk transmission after all. Although the 
Europol Regulation contains a Human Rights clause (art.23 para.9) and a (general) 
ban on purely automated decision making on basis of sensitive data (art.30 para.4; 
cf. art.10 of the Data Protection Directive), the legal basis for the EU TFTS must go 
further and indicate the intrusiveness of the techniques applied by denominating 
the forms of automated data analysis deployed, their overall logic and the 
additional sources consulted to collate analysis results.  That is to say: the fact that 
the EU TFTS will be based on link analysis including a definition thereof, the 
maximum number of ‘hops’ to be taken and the data bases used to generate 
suspicion in the first place and to cross-check the results of the extraction have to 
be laid down by law. Whilst the EDPS is already to be consulted beforehand under 
art.39, a soft oversight mechanism has to be established in order to ensure the 
state-of-the-art quality of the system. Here, the Europol Data Protection Board 
under art.44f. might serve as a suitable forum. 
 
                                                          
294 Supra no.143, para.71. 
295 Supra no.283. 
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4. Data sharing with the U.S. 
As to a reciprocity mechanism with the U.S., the new Umbrella-Agreement is 
supposed to establish an adequate level of data protection for transatlantic data 
transfers for law enforcement purposes. Since the agreement itself does not build 
a legal basis for data sharing but imposes a framework of minimum safeguards to 
be fulfilled in every context, the U.S. and the EU would still have to agree on a 
cooperation under the EU TFTS. Irrespective of whether this cooperation will be 
modeled on the current reciprocity clauses, it has been doubted that Umbrella 
indeed ensures adequate protection to data subjects affected by data transfers.296 
It is outside the remit of this thesis to assess Umbrella’s compliance with the criteria 
deriving from CJEU-case law on arts.7 and 8 EUCFR. There are however two 
minimum oversight conditions to be provided for in a future EU TFTS/SWIFT III that 
will be hard to compromise on with the U.S.: 
 
Firstly, and in line with the ECtHR’s finding in Szabó and Vissy,297 ex ante judicial 
approval should also be obligatory for U.S. search requests as mere ex post (judical) 
oversight might be hampered by the principle of originator’s control. The U.S.’ need 
for secrecy can be met by appropriate procedural safeguards, in particular in 
camera proceedings. 
 
Secondly, any data shared with the UST must not be disseminated to other U.S. or 
third country agencies without prior approval by Europol (however, urgency 
procedures should be implemented). All transfers, requests for dissemination and 
cases of urgency shall be duly documented on behalf of Europol and made accessible 
to the EDPS (who is allowed to access EU restricted information under the 
Regulation). Thus, in case of mishandling, the EDPS could at least effectuate his 
power to impose a preliminary ban on further transfers to the UST.  
 
5. EU TFTS without alternative? 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the set-up of an EU TFTS would add another layer 
of surveillance to the EU realm. EU data protection watchdogs repeatedly pointed 
out that a mere ‘added value’ for EU counter-terrorism was an insufficient 
justification for an EU TFTS;298 in particular, the Article 29 Working Party ‘would 
                                                          
296 Korff, supra no.214. 
297 Supra no.184. 
298 EDPS, supra no.287. 
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find it difficult to accept any justification which allows the continuation of the US-
TFTP agreement in parallel with the establishment of an EU TFTS’.299 However, the 
last impact assessment put into question whether less intrusive means of financial 
intelligence are as efficient as an EU TFTS.300 Remarkably, instead of publishing the 
announced paper on a complementary EU TFTS, the Commission focussed on 
strengthening the EU Financial Intelligence Unit Platform in its October 2017 
progress report.301 Again, this rather appears to be a complementary approach to a 
future EU TFTS and neither does it come without data protection concerns.302 
 
However, the establishment of a system described in this chapter does not only 
challenge individual rights. Neither is it obvious that the EU could act on the basis 
of its ordinary competence and procedure. Therefore, the last chapter will 
investigate whether EU primary law provides for sufficient EU powers. 
                                                          
299 Letter from Jacob Kohnstamm to Cecilia Malmström (29 September 2011) 
<file:///C:/Users/HP/Downloads/20110929_letter_to_commission_tfts_en.pdf> accessed 
23 June 2018. 
300 2013 TFTS Study, supra no.5, 29. 
301 Commission, Eleventh progress report towards an effective and genuine Security Union, 
COM (2017) 608 final, 5f. 
302 In particular regarding the oversight structure of FIUs: supra no.299. 
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E. Chapter 4: A question of competence 
So far, the EU’s competence to establish an EU TFTS has been understood as a 
matter of shared competence in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) 
according to arts.82 and 87 TFEU.303 Respectively, it was art.87 TFEU in connection 
with art.216 TFEU which served as legal basis for SWIFT II. However, the question 
of competence should be dealt with increased attention. The CJEU’s case law on 
the distribution of competences with regard to police cooperation was rather 
inconsistent before the Lisbon Treaty came into force.304 The PNR Canada case was 
the first opportunity for the Court to rule on the post-Lisbon competences on data 
protection in the context of counter-terrorism and it found the legal basis chosen 
(arts.82 and 87 TFEU) incorrect, for falling short of art.16 para.2 TFEU.305  
 
This chapter will put the Commission’s assumption of competence into question, 
firstly, by demonstrating that with respect to Europol, primary law is far from clear 
as to which investigative powers can be conferred to the agency. Secondly, it will 
be argued that the security terminology of the treaties suggests a restrictive 
interpretation. Thirdly, it is concluded that the EU TFTS requires reliance on the 
flexibility clause resulting in a different legal procedure. 
 
I. art.88 TFEU: the Europol legal basis  
If Europol indeed was tasked with requesting financial data from designated 
providers, this would require the power to directly retrieve personal data from 
databases held by private parties for commercial purposes. Under the Europol 
Regulation, however, Europol is forbidden to collect any personal data unless it has 
been transferred by a Member State, Union body, third state or international 
organisation or can be directly retrieved from publicly accessible sources (art.17 
paras.1 and 2). Affirmed in art.26 paras.1, 2 and 9, Europol is interdicted from any 
contact with private parties in order to retrieve personal data, including data 
retrieval with the consent of the concerned data subject. The Regulation would 
preclude Europol from issuing subpoenas or any other kind of requests to designated 
providers. Thus, this power has to be conferred to Europol in order to set up an EU 
TFTS as described in the previous chapter. 
                                                          
303 2013 TFTS Study, supra no.5, 15. 
304 EU-US PNR 2006, supra no.23; Case C-301/06 Ireland v European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union (2009) ECLI:EU:C:2009:68 on the 2006 Data Retention 
Directive. 
305 PNR Canada, supra no.10, paras.76ff., 95ff. 
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Any alterations to Europol’s legal framework must concur with the procedural and 
substantial provisions set out in art.88 TFEU.306  The Lisbon Treaty significantly 
amended art.88 with the aim of upgrading Europol from a mere assistant agency to 
a partner with the Member States’ law enforcement services.307 Whilst Europol’s 
core mandate as information hub is mirrored in art.88 para.2 lit.a stating that ‘the 
collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of information, in particular 
that forwarded by the authorities of the Member States or third countries or bodies’ 
is a task subject to the ordinary legislative procedure, para.3 clarifies that ‘[any] 
operational action by Europol must be carried out in liaison and in agreement with 
the […] Member States whose territory is concerned’ and that ‘[the] application of 
coercive measures shall be exclusive responsibility of the competent national 
authorities’.  
 
1. Production orders within the remit of Europol’s data collection mandate? 
Issuing data requests to designated providers on first sight appears in perfect 
compliance with Europol’s ‘collection’ capacity mentioned in art.88 para.2 lit.a 
TFEU. The non-exhaustive enumeration of the data sources allows for a broad 
understanding of the provision, that is to say the power to retrieve data indirectly 
from other law enforcement authorities and directly from private parties. On the 
other hand, this might contravene para.3 interdicting Europol from applying 
coercive measures while executing its tasks.308 Literally, subpoenas incorporate a 
coercive element. However, systematically, the exclusion of coercive measures 
refers to operational actions309 that are distinct from data processing generally, 
although both forms of police activity are often closely connected.310 In fact, data 
                                                          
306 Steve Peers, EU justice and home affairs law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2011), 
877; eventually, art.87 para.2 lit.a in connection with art.88 para.2 lit.a TFEU would build 
a joint legal basis (together with art.16 TFEU). 
307 Ibid, 871f. 
308 Bettina Schöndorf-Haubold, ‘Europäisches Sicherheitsverwaltungsrecht, § 35’, in: Jörg 
Philipp Terhechte (ed.), Verwaltungsrecht in der Europäischen Union (Nomos 2011), 1212, 
1231. 
309 Operational cooperation is understood as any ‘action related to concrete 
cases/events/crisis/phenomena that require a trans-national approach whereby all the 
concerned authorities of the Member States’ competent at national level collaborate with 
each other and with the competent Union bodies’: Council, ‘Discussion paper on the future 
Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI) - Constitutional Treaty, art.III-261; 
21/02/2005’ doc.6626/05, para.15; Oliver Dörr, ‘AEUV Art. 276 [Unzuständigkeit des EuGH 
für mitgliedstaatliche Polizeimaßnahmen]’ in: Eberhard Grabitz et al. (eds), Das Recht der 
Europäischen Union (60th EL October 2016), para.13. 
310 Cf. Peers, supra no.306, 876 with reference to the distinction between art.87 para.2 
and para.3 TFEU. 
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collection by law enforcement agencies might cross the line from informational to 
operational activity. 
 
2. Production orders: ‘the operational level of intelligence’311 kept to the 
Member States? 
Albeit Europol is eligible to take part in operational action according to art.88 para.2 
lit.b and para.3 sentence 1 TFEU, for example in Joint Investigation Teams, it is 
limited to merely supportive action. As soon as any contribution requires the 
application of coercive powers, these are exclusively reserved to the respective 
national authorities. Coercive measures include, inter alia, the powers to arrest a 
person, to search a person or a location312 as well as to covertly observe a person 
by telephone surveillance or eavesdropping.313 The latter examples demonstrate 
that art.88 para.3 sentence 2 TFEU might very well exclude certain methods of 
information gathering.314 However, the legal background of the exclusion of 
coercive measures from Europol’s powers is contentious: 
 
a. The State monopoly of force 
The exclusion could aim at protecting the Member States’ monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force.315 Art.88 para.3 TFEU is generally understood as a specific 
application of the general rule found in art.72 TFEU316 according to which the 
exercise of the national responsibilities in maintaining law and order and internal 
security shall not be impeded by the fifth title of the TFEU. However, it remains 
indefinite as to which powers exactly flow from the monopoly of force. It is widely 
agreed that immediate physical force traditionally is at the heart of the monopoly; 
317 however, this does not explain why Europol is excluded from eavesdropping and 
                                                          
311 Taken from: Kristof Clerix, ‘Ilkka Salmi, the EU's spymaster’ 
<https://www.mo.be/en/interview/ilkka-salmi-eu-s-007> accessed 29 June 2017, quoting 
the director of INTCEN (EEA intelligence hub) as saying: ‘[We are] not an operational 
agency. We do not have a collection capability. […] We do not carry out clandestine 
operations. The operational level of intelligence is the Member States’ responsibility’. 
312 Elena Spaeth, ‘AEUV Artikel 88 (ex-Artikel 30 EUV) [Europol]’, in: Hans von der Groeben 
et al (eds), Europäisches Unionsrecht (7th edn, C.H. Beck 2015), para.3. 
313 Knut Amelung, ‘Zwangsbefugnisse für Europol?’, in: Jürgen Wolter et al (eds), 
Alternativentwurf Europol und europäischer Datenschutz (C.F. Müller 2008), 233, 240. 
314 Cf. Nicholas Grief, ‘EU law and security’ (2007) 32 ELR 752, 759ff. 
315 Peter-Christian Müller-Graf, ‘Artikel 72 AEUV [Nicht berührte Zuständigkeiten der 
Mitgliedstaaten]’, in: Matthias Pechstein et al (eds), Frankfurter Kommentar zu EUV, GRC 
und AEUV (Mohr Siebeck 2017), para.3. 
316 Peers, supra no.306, 55. 
317 Cf. Christian Callies, ‘Die Europäisierung der Staatsaufgabe Sicherheit unter den 
Rahmenbedingungen des freiheitichen Rechtsstaats’, in: Erwin Müller and Patricia 
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communications surveillance.318 Unsurprisingly, definitions of the boundaries vary 
and may even include mere announcements of the application of (physical) force in 
order to achieve obedience to a legal duty.319 Assuming that the monopoly of the 
use of force comprises coercion of any kind, direct or indirect, the conferral of 
investigative competences to the Commission in matters of competition law (art.105 
TFEU)320 would apparently intrude on the preserved area of sovereignty. 
Conclusively, in order to shape the scope of art.88 para.3 sentence 2 TFEU, the 
institution of the state monopoly of force appears too vague after all.321 
 
b. Interference with Fundamental Rights: a national prerogative? 
Another reason for limiting Europol’s powers in information gathering might be the 
intrusiveness of secret surveillance to the fundamental rights of the concerned 
persons, requiring a high level of justification that should be reserved to the special 
relationship between the Member States and their individuals.322 Undeniably, 
coercive and clandestine police action interferes severely with individual rights; as 
elaborated in chapter 3, the production orders would amount to considerable human 
rights intrusions for the data subjects affected. Nevertheless, other methods and 
stages of data processing are not necessarily less intrusive, especially if conducted 
on a large scale, but are certainly in the remit of Europol, which is clearly 
demonstrated in the new Europol Regulation. Thus, the particular relevance of 
fundamental rights is a coincidental but not exclusive feature of coercive measures 
and can neither define the line between art.88 para.2 lit.a and para.3 when it 
comes to data retrieval. 
 
Therefore, the following paragraphs will take a general look at the distribution of 
competences in the AFSJ in order to figure out whether art.88 para.2 lit.a TFEU is 
open to a broad or narrow interpretation. 
                                                          
Schneider (eds), Die Europäische Union im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus: Sicherheit vs. 
Freiheit? (Nomos 2006), 83, 89. 
318 Amelung, supra no.313, 240, 248. 
319 Stephan Bittner, ‘Zwangsmittel im Recht der Europäischen Union: Geteilte Rechtsmacht 
in Europa’, in: Manfred Zuleeg (ed), Europa als Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des 
Rechts (Nomos 2007), 9, 10ff. 
320 Amelung, supra no.313, 241f. 
321 Ibid, 248.   
322 Cf. Anna Jonsson Cornell, ‘EU Police Cooperation Post-Lisbon’ in: Maria Bergström and 
Cornell (eds), European Police and Criminal Law Co-operation (Hart Publ. 2014), 147, 
150f.  
80 
 
 
 Chapter 4: A question of competence  
II. EU competences in the AFSJ: security (terminology) in the making 
With the Lisbon Treaty, the AFSJ was fully integrated into the European Union’s 
supranational policies as a matter of shared competence between the Union and 
the Member States. This comes with the effect of ‘pre-emptive Union action’, 
meaning that so long and so far as the Union exercises its competence, the Member 
States are excluded from legislative action (art.2 para.2 TFEU). This also holds true 
for the previous ‘third pillar’ of police and justice cooperation in criminal matters 
(chapters 4 and 5 of Title V) which now form equal part of the AFSJ, besides policies 
on border checks, asylum and immigration (chapter 2) and judicial cooperation in 
civil matters (chapter 3). However, chapters 4 and 5 kept a number of exceptional 
provisions, e.g. art.82 para.2, 3 and art.83 para.2, 3 TFEU providing for what is 
referred to as ‘emergency-brake clauses’ when it comes to the approximation of 
substantive and procedural criminal law. These particularities apparently correlate 
to the Member States’ prior responsibility for ‘internal security’ as mirrored in 
art.72 TFEU. 
 
Moreover, the Treaty Reform introduced the notion of ‘national security’ in art.73 
TFEU and art.4 para.2 sentences 2 and 3 TEU. Whilst the former somewhat 
nebulously states that ‘[it] shall be open to Member States to organise between 
themselves and under their responsibility such forms of cooperation and 
coordination as they deem appropriate between the competent departments of 
their administrations responsible for safeguarding national security’, art.4 para.2 
TEU seems to fundamentally delineate Union policy from the purely national realm:  
 
‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as 
well as their national identities […]. It shall respect their essential State 
functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining 
law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national 
security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.’ 
 
The meaning of ‘national security’ as distinct from ‘internal security’ is far from 
clear.323 The Court has not yet had the chance to deliver its understanding of the 
                                                          
323 Grief, supra no.314, 754ff.; a good summary on the (inconsistent) security terminology 
of the Treaties can be found in: Gloria Gonzalez Fuster et al, ‘Discussion paper on legal 
approaches to security, privacy and personal data protection’ (PRISMS Deliverable 5.1, 
2013), 3ff. 
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security terminology used in the Treaties.324 The strong wording suggests that the 
Member States wanted to restrain the EU in security matters. If so, the Union 
competences within the AFSJ, including art.88 para.2 lit.a TFEU, might require a 
restrictive interpretation. 
 
1. Background of ‘Christophersen Clause’ 
Originally stemming from the context of complementary competences (now art.6 
TFEU), art.4 para.2 TEU was introduced as a general rule regarding the distribution 
of competences between the Union and the Member States. Instead of enumerating 
negative competences  deemed not to be conferred to the Union, the responsible 
Committee325 decided to reinforce the principle of respect of the national identities 
(now: sentences 1 and 2) to prevent the EU from silently extending its competences 
beyond the wording of the Treaties.326 Interestingly, it was no later than at the 
Convent of Europe when the term ‘national security’ replaced ‘internal security’ in 
sentence 2 and that sentence 3 was added.327  Together with art.73 TFEU, art.4 
para.2 was included in the texts upon request from the UK government328 and 
welcomed by the Member States who allegedly wanted to prevent the Union from 
further encroaching on their security competences in the context of counter-
terrorism.329 
 
What can be derived from the evolution of art.4 para.2 TEU and arts.72, 73 TFEU 
was subject to controversy, first and foremost in respect of the applicability of EU 
                                                          
324 As to derogations from the market freedoms, the Court defined the term of ‘public 
security’: Tsakouridis, supra no.293; however, this is little helpful for the delineation of 
competences: Alicia Hinarejos, ‘Law and order and internal security provisions in the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice: before and after Lisbon’, in: Christina Eckes and 
Theodore Konstadinides, Crime within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(Cambridge University Press 2011), 249ff. 
325 Headed by the former Danish Prime Minister and EU-Commissioner Henning 
Christophersen. 
326 For this and the previous: Barbara Guastaferro, ‘Beyond the Exceptionalism of 
Constitutional Conflicts: The Ordinary Functions of the Identity Clause’ (2012) 31 YEL 263, 
271ff. 
327  Christian Calliess et al, ‘EU-Vertrag (Lissabon) Art.4 [Zuständigkeiten der Union, 
nationale Identität, loyale Zusammenarbeit]’, in: Callies and Matthias Ruffert (eds), 
EUV/AEUV (5th edn, C.H. Beck 2016), para.6 no.17. 
328 Jean-Claude Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: a legal and political analysis (Cambridge 
University Press 2010), 191; lateron, the UK government explained that the meaning of 
‘national security’ was identical to what formely had been the ‘internal security of each 
Member State’ but constantly had caused confusion with the notion of ‘internal security of 
the Union’: House of Lords, The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment. Volume I: Report 
(2008), 157f. 
329 Walter Obwexer, ‘EUV Artikel 4 [Zuständigkeiten der Union]’, in: von der Groeben et 
al, supra no.312, para.46. 
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fundamental rights and the consequences for the NSA affair.330 However, as will be 
shown in the subsequent parapgraphs, the arguments issued are no less relevant for 
the delineation of competences in the AFSJ.  
 
2. No restraint in matters of security? 
According to Peers, neither the new provisions on ‘national security’ nor art.72 TFEU 
on ‘internal security’ impose any general reservations on EU competences in the 
AFSJ.  Otherwise, there was no need of express procedural or substantial exceptions 
(e.g. the emergency brake clauses or art.79 para.5 TFEU). If any, restrictions were 
to be interpreted narrowly, irrespective of Art.4 para.2 TEU which could not be 
more specific than art.72 TFEU for its nearly identical wording and the fact that it 
merely commands the Union’s ‘respect’ for the Member States.331 On the other 
hand, Art.73 TFEU could neither restrain Union competence since it addresses only 
the Member States which shall not be excluded from further action.332  
 
Following Peers’ approach, art.88 para.2 lit.a TFEU is open to broad interpretation 
whilst the exclusion of coercive measures – as an exception to the rule – must be 
understood narrowly. Consequently, Europol could be provided with further data 
retrieval capacities in order to establish an EU TFTS. However, denying any impact 
of art.4 para.2 TEU on the distribution of competences between the Union and the 
Member States regarding security sensitive issues conflicts with its wording and 
systematic position: Whilst sentence 3 is unbiased in declaring national security to 
remain ‘the sole responsibility of the Member States’, art.4 para.2 TEU clearly finds 
itself in the context of conferral of competences. Its preceding paragraph rephrases 
the principle of conferral as to the competences which (exclusively) remain with 
the Member States;  art.5 TEU sets out the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and 
proportionality; art.3 TEU dealing with the Union’s objectives closes noting that 
‘the Union shall pursue its objectives by appropriate means commensurate with the 
competences which are conferred upon it in the Treaties’ (para.6). This is 
                                                          
330 Pars pro toto: Douwe Korff, ‘Expert Opinion prepared for the Committee of Inquiry of 
the Bundestag into the “5Eyes” global surveillance systems revealed by Edward Snowden’ 
(Committee Hearing of 5 June 2014) 
<https://www.bundestag.de/blob/282874/8f5bae2c8f01cdabd37c746f98509253/mat_a_sv-
4-3_korff-pdf-data.pdf> accessed 06 July 2018, 35ff. 
331 Similar: Armin von Bogdandy and Stephan Schill, ‘EUV Art. 4 Prinzipien der föderativen 
Grundstruktur’, in: Grabitz et al, supra no.309, para.35; Obwexer, supra no.329, para.52; 
Volker Röben, ‘AEUV Art.72 Nationale Zuständigkeiten’ in Eberhard Grabitz et al (eds), Das 
Recht der Europäischen Union (61st edn, C.H. Beck 2017), para.16. 
332 For the entire paragraph: Peers, no.306, 54ff. 
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furthermore backed up by the provision’s intention to render a negative catalogue 
of competences superfluous.333  
 
3. National security: a domaine reservée? 
Müller-Graff takes the opposite position to Peers, concluding that art.72 TFEU and 
art.4 para.2 sentence 2, 3 TEU guard the Member States’ domaine reservée. 
Consequently, EU competences within the AFSJ were to be interpreted 
restrictively.334 He understands ‘internal security’ as a subset of ‘national security’, 
inter alia protecting the state monopoly of force. At the most, Member States could 
be urged to execute their reserved competences in security matters in loyalty to 
the Union as emphasised in art.4 para.3 TEU.335  
 
Accordingly, art.88 para.2 lit.a TFEU required a narrow reading with the 
consequence that Europol could not be tasked with data collection further than 
indirect retrieval. However, Müller-Graff’s approach does not credit the fact that a 
multitude of competences were conferred to the EU in the field of internal security 
for legislative action. It is now in the Union’s competences to build up a 
considerable body of substantial and procedural criminal law (arts.82, 83 TFEU) and 
– prospectively – prosecution capacities (art.86 TFEU). Admittedly, these 
competences depend on unanimity in the Council but they are not excluded from 
EU policy a priori. The set-up of Frontex on the basis of art.77 para.2 lit.b, c and d 
TFEU gives evidence of the Union’s far reaching powers in matters of border 
control.336 Furthermore, derogative clauses referring to ‘public security’ (e.g. 
art.36 TFEU) or ‘essential interests of [the Member States’] security’ (e.g. art.347 
TFEU) demonstrate that the Member States are not entirely free from European 
regulation while executing their responsibilities in internal and national security.337 
                                                          
333 For this and the previous: cf. Guastaferro, supra no.326, 271ff. 
334 Consenting as to the restrictive interpretation of EU competences: Stephan 
Breitenmoser and Robert Weyeneth, ‘AEUV Artikel 72’, in: von der Groeben et al, supra 
no.312, paras.4ff.; Calliess et al, supra no.327, para.21.  
335 For the entire paragraph: Müller-Graf, supra no.315, paras.1ff. 
336 Although exercise of coercive powers is under supervision of the Host Member State and 
only permissible within the boundaries of respective national law: Jorrit J. Rijpma, 
‘Frontex and the European System of Border Guards. The future of European Border 
Management’, in: Maria Fletcher et al (eds), The European Union as an Area Freedom, 
Security and Justice (Routledge 2017), 217, 237f. 
337 Hermann-Josef Blanke, ‘Article 4 [The Relations Between the EU and the Member 
States]’, in: Blanke and Stelio Mangiameli, The Treaty on European Union (TEU): a 
commentary (Springer 2013), paras.77ff. 
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4. Relative competence in security matters? 
Möstl pursues a significantly different approach interpreting art.72 TFEU as a 
provision of ‘relative’ competence. Pointing at the provision’s wording that merely 
prevents the Member States from being ‘affected’ in their responsibility on internal 
security, art.72 TFEU primarily preserved the Member States’ margin of 
appreciation as to their appropriate level of security, regardless of the minimum 
level flowing from EU action. Since the AFSJ aimed at a high level of security,338 
art.72 TFEU simply clarified that Union action was deemed to complement the 
Member States’ action where necessary; however, the EU should neither substitute 
the Member States’ role nor exclude any further measures being taken at national 
level.339  
 
Under this assumption and against the background that the Member States have not 
built up their own capacities for large scale financial monitoring, art.88 para.2 lit.a 
TFEU could serve as a legal basis for tasking Europol with the EU TFTS. Nevertheless, 
interpreting art.72 TFEU as a provision basically leading to parallel competences of 
the Union and the Member States in the field of internal security appears incoherent 
with the system on shared competences set out in art.2 para.2 and art.4 TFEU. 
Where the TFEU wishes to prevent the pre-emption of Member State competences, 
it says so expressly (e.g. art.4 paras.3 and 4 TFEU). Introducing the category of 
‘relative competence’ (as distinguished from ‘parallel’) rather adds to the 
complexity of the security terminology used in the Treaties. 
 
5. Intelligence agencies: The clue to the puzzle? 
Remarkably, it is widely agreed that intelligence agencies are beyond EU policies 
and competences because they operate at the very heart of national security as laid 
down in art.4 para.2 TEU.340 If given an institutional meaning rather than a 
functional interpretation,341 ‘national security’ would primarily restrain the EU to 
                                                          
338 See: art.67 para.3 TFEU. 
339 For this and the previous as to the identical worded predecessor: Markus Möstl, Die 
staatliche Garantie für die öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung: Sicherheitsgewährleistung 
im Verfassungsstaat, im Bundesstaat und in der Europäischen Union (Mohr Siebeck 2002), 
601ff.; ‚Grundfragen Europäischer Polizeilicher Kooperation, in: Dieter Kugelmann (ed) 
Migration, Datenübermittlung und Cybersicherheit (Nomos 2016), 9, 14f. 
340 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Surveillance by intelligence 
services: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EU. Mapping Member States' 
legal frameworks (2015), 6f. 
341 Heinrich Amadeus Wolff, ‘BDSG 2018 § 45 Anwendungsbereich’, in: Wolff and Stefan 
Brink (eds), BeckOK Datenschutzrecht (24th edn, C.H. Beck 2018), para.20f. 
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(partly) accroach on the business of national intelligence services through wide 
effectuation of its competences.342 Symptomatically, there is neither an ‘EU 
intelligence service’ existent under the current EU framework343 nor a definition of 
intelligence services found in the Treaties altogether. Irrespective of the variety of 
intelligence agencies in the Member States, it can be summed up that their mandate 
is focused on data collection (of any kind) and analysis whilst lacking further 
operational powers.344 Thus, regularly collecting the same information while 
pursuing different purposes, intelligence services work in parallel to national law 
enforcement agencies.  
 
Whereas this parallelism is not continued at EU level, Europol is also tasked with 
‘data processing’ but limited as to operational powers. With Europol’s focus on 
transnational crime in general and counter-terrorism in particular, its field of action 
is likely to collide with the national intelligence agencies. It comes as no surprise 
that Europol must not require the Member States to ‘disclose information relating 
to organisations or specific intelligence activities in the field of national security’ 
(art.7 para.7 lit.c Europol Regulation).345 In a general manner, this is corroborated 
in Declarations nos.20 and 21 to the Lisbon Treaty as to the impact of EU data 
protection rules on matters of national security and in the police sector, suggesting 
that the AFSJ ‘is not a normal area of law where the general framework of data 
protection applies’.346 Therefore, it is this thesis’ stance that with regards to data 
collection for security purposes, the Treaties preserve the Member States’ 
prerogative of first access to data in order to ensure the institutional protection of 
intelligence services. This prerogative must not be undermined by an extensive 
interpretation of art.88 para.2 lit.a TFEU. An exception is only compliant with EU 
primary law where Member States could not claim any exclusivity whatsoever, that 
                                                          
342 Hansjörg Geiger, ‘Rechtliche Grenzen der Europäisierung nachrichtendienstlicher 
Aufgaben’, in: Thomas Jäger and Anna Daun (eds), Geheimdienste in Europa 
Transformation, Kooperation und Kontrolle (VS Verlag 2009), 240, 244. 
343 INTCEN is no operational service but merely provides analyses and policy 
recommendations which are based on the national intelligence services’ strategic 
information: Mai’a K. Davis Cross, ‘A European Transgovernmental Intelligence Network 
and the Role of IntCen’ (2013) 14 Perspectives on European Politics and Society 388, 393.  
344 FRA, supra no.340, 27. 
345 Mirroring the CJEU’s understanding of ‘state security’: Case C-300/11 ZZ v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department (2013) ECLI:EU:C:2013:363, para.66. 
346 Julia Ballaschk, ‘In the Unseen Realm: Transnational Intelligence Sharing in the 
European Union – Challenges to Fundamental Rights and Democratic Legitimacy’ (2015) 
Stan JInt’l L 19, 29.  
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is to say where data is openly accessible to anyone, mirrored in art.17 para.2 
Europol Regulation.  
 
This finding is affirmed in art.73 TFEU which was introduced alongside of art.4 
para.2 TEU into the body of primary law. Referring to the ‘competent departments 
of [the Member States’] administrations responsible for safeguarding national 
security’, the provision expressly displays an institutional understanding of ‘national 
security’. There is no reason apparent suggesting that the notion of national security 
was used differently in art.4 TEU and art.73 TFEU, although art.73 TFEU confusingly 
declares cooperation and coordination on these matters ‘open to the Member 
States’. Some authors derive from this wording that the Treaties grant the Member 
States the opportunity to conclude bilateral agreements on internal security 
cooperation (e.g. for Transnational Police Units);347 others understand art.73 TFEU 
to exclude the pre-emptive effect of art.2 para.2 TFEU.348 However, the wording 
might be simply misleading349 since the Member States have never been excluded 
from security cooperation beyond the AFSJ – irrespective of the competences 
conferred upon the Union in (internal) security matters.350 
 
Hence, primary law suggests the understanding that Europol’s competences in data 
collection must be handled restrictively, preventing the EU from conferring further 
powers of direct data retrieval to the agency for purposes of an EU TFTS on the 
basis of art.88 para.2 lit.a TFEU. Nevertheless, the flexibility clause might offer an 
alternative legal basis if the Council can agree on the EU TFTS unanimously. 
 
III. Effectuating the flexibility clause 
The Commission already indicated that implementing the vision of a Security Union 
could require the effectuation of art.352 TFEU.351 Art.352 TFEU sets out four explicit 
substantive requirements which must be met in order to serve as a legal basis for 
the EU TFTS. 
                                                          
347 Müller-Graff, ‘Artikel 73 AEUV [Zusammenarbeit der Mitgliedstaaten in eigener 
Verantwortung]’, in: Pechstein et al, supra no.315, paras.2f.; Möstl, supra no.339, 17f. 
348 Cf. Matthias Rossi, ‘AEUV Art.73 [Zusammenarbeit der Mitgliedstaaten]’, in: 
Calliess/Ruffert, supra no.327, para.2. 
349 Marcel Kau, ‘Justice and Home Affairs in the European Constitutional Process – Keeping 
the Faith and Substance of the Constitution’, in: Stafan Griller/Jacques Ziller (eds), The 
Lisbon Treaty (Springer 2008), 223, 229. 
350 As to the mere declaratory nature: Müller-Graff, supra no.347, para.1. 
351 European Political Strategy Centre, ‘Towards a "Security Union" - Bolstering the EU's 
Counter-Terrorism Response’ EPSC Strategic Notes 12/2016, 2. 
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Firstly, the flexibility clause can be relied upon only with the aim of attaining a 
policy objective contained in the Treaties. For the establishment of an EU TFTS, it 
is primarily the objective of prevention and persecution of terrorism mirrored in 
art.88 para.1 TFEU outlining Europol’s mission to strengthen the Member States’ 
action and art.222 TFEU concerning the prevention of terrorist attacks352 pursued 
when invoking art.352 TFEU. 
 
Secondly, the EU must lack the competence that shall be drawn from art.352 TFEU. 
A lack of competence is not reduced to the case that the Treaties do not provide 
any competence on the matter at all; if primary law contains a competence which 
either falls short of the objectives to be achieved therewith or which is unclear in 
scope, art.352 TFEU can be applied in connection with the respective provision.353 
As demonstrated in the previous paragraphs, it is at least unclear if art.88 para.2 
lit.a TFEU provides Europol with the necessary competence of direct data retrieval.  
Due to the flexibility clause’s exceptionality, every means of interpretation has to 
be exhausted beforehand, including an effet utile interpretation or applying the 
implied powers doctrine.354 Albeit art.67 para.3 TFEU stipulates the objective of a 
‘high level of security’ within Europe, effet utile would conflict with the previous 
finding that EU competences in the AFSJ have to be interpreted restrictively unless 
the wording suggests otherwise.355 As opposed to art.77 para.2 lit. d TFEU on the 
establishment of an integrated border control system, art.88 para.2 lit.a TFEU does 
not permit ‘any measure’ but indicates the nature of the data sources in order to 
achieve the task of data collection. Moreover, as observed by Herlin-Karnell, a 
‘focus on security in combination with the effectiveness mantra constitutes a 
particularly dangerous combination’.356 Against this background, there is no room 
for effet utile.  
 
Neither could extended powers over data retrieval be inferred from the implied 
powers doctrine that merely justifies the implementation of measures inevitable to 
exercise conferred powers (so-called ‘narrow approach’) or defined tasks (‘wider 
                                                          
352 Ibid. 
353 ECJ, Case C-8/73 Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v. Massey-Ferguson ECR 897, para.4; 
however, the complementary application of art.352 TFEU is contentious: Rossi, ‘AEUV Art. 
352 [Flexibilitätsklausel]’, in: Calliess/Ruffert, supra no.327, paras.66ff. 
354 Ibid, paras.61ff. 
355 Calliess et al, supra no.334. 
356 Ester Herlin-Karnell, The constitutional dimension of European criminal law (Hart Publ. 
2012), 85. 
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approach’) in a reasonable and efficient manner.357 Direct access to data subjects 
is not necessary for Europol in order to fulfil its task of data collection generally, 
nor is there any other power conferred to Europol which could not be exercised 
without direct data retrieval.358  
 
Thirdly, Union action must be necessary to achieve the treaty objective. That is to 
say that primary law has to display a discrepancy between the competences 
conferred to the Union and the objectives set out in the Treaties; the Commission 
and Council can claim a margin of (political) appreciation when it comes to 
qualifying whether this discrepancy is tolerable or not.359 Against the background of 
the horrific attacks during the last two years alone and the assumption that 
homegrown terrorists and foreign fighters who returned to Europe pose an increased 
security risk to the safety of European people, it seems unlikely that the Court 
would put the Commission’s assessment into question that vesting Europol with 
further data retrieval competences is necessary for the set up an EU TFTS.360  
 
Fourthly, the competence to be derived from art.352 TFEU must not exceed the 
framework of the policies defined in the Treaties in order to attain the objective. 
Seemingly a rather redundant requirement, not all of the Treaties’ policies are open 
to the flexibility clause: in matters of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
art.352 para.4 TFEU excludes the clause’s applicability. Moreover, the invocation 
of art.352 TFEU must respect the concerned policy’s distinct character; therefore, 
it can be questioned if the flexibility clause can be effectuated at all within the 
AFSJ.361 From the clearly defined exclusion of CFSP issues, however, it can be 
deduced contrariwise that the AFSJ shall not be immune to art.352 TFEU. 
Nonetheless, the provisions mirroring the Member States’ special status and primary 
responsibilities regarding the maintenance of internal and national security must 
                                                          
357 Lorna Woods et al, Steiner & Woods EU law (13th edn, Oxford University Press 2017), 
68f. 
358 In fact, art.88 TFEU does not refer to any concrete powers at all since para.2 merely 
enumerates tasks. 
359 T. C. Hartley, The foundations of European Union law: an introduction to the 
constitutional and administrative law of the European Union (7th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2010), 112f. 
360 Europol, TESAT European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017, 10ff.; cf. 
European Political Strategy Centre, supra no.351, 7: ‘In the framework of the area of 
freedom, security and justice Article 68, 74, 75, 77, 83, 84 and 87 TFEU comprise certain 
European competences that allow for (limited) action to prevent terrorism. These enable 
the EU to establish measures with regard to capital movements and payments (…)’. 
361 Calliess et al, supra no.334. 
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not be circumvented by relying on the flexibility clause.362 This is where the CJEU 
clarified beforehand that the flexibility clause cannot substitute formal 
amendments to the Treaties. Whilst the red line between minor adjustments and 
major changes of primary law tends to blur, the Court stated that art.352 TFEU did 
not provide the Union with Kompetenz-Kompetenz.363 
 
However, the establishment of an EU TFTS is unlikely to generally undermine the 
Member States’ prerogative in internal or national security. The fact that the 
Member States so far could not build up the capacities to extensively monitor 
financial communications within their respective territories indicates otherwise. As 
long as Europol’s powers on information gathering are not extended to generally 
retrieve personal data directly364, the legal boundaries set out by arts.72, 73 TFEU 
and art.4 para.2 sentences 2, 3 TEU are still observed. Thus, a formal amendment 
of the Treaties is unnecessary in order to set up an EU TFTS. 
 
To sum up, the flexibility clause provides a suitable legal basis for the establishment 
of an EU TFTS (together with art.87 para.2 and art.16 TFEU). However, the 
implementation of security sensitive measures without express legal basis in 
primary law seems to confirm the exact concerns raised by the German 
Constitutional Court towards silent amendments of the Treaties lacking sufficient 
national democratic legitimation and undermining the Member States’ 
sovereignty.365 Against this background, unanimous decision finding in the Council 
is all but certain. 
                                                          
362 For this and the previous: Rossi, supra no.353, para.42. 
363 ECJ, Opinion 2/94, Accession of EC to ECHR (1996) ECLI:EU:C:1996:140, para.30. 
364 Cf. Schöndorf-Haubold, supra no.308, 1259. 
365 BVerfGE 123, 267, 394f; the Court’s ‘anxiety towards integration’ was criticised, e.g.: 
Daniela Winkler, ‘Vergangenheit und Zukunft der Flexibilitätsklausel im Spannungsfeld von 
unionalem Integrations- und mitgliedstaatlichem Souveränitätsanspruch - Eine Analyse von 
Artikel 352 AEUV unter dem Eindruck des BVerfG-Urteils zu "Lissabon"’ (2011) Europarecht 
384ff. 
90 
 
 
 CONCLUSION  
F. CONCLUSION 
The investigation has shown that the current SWIFT II scheme constitutes multiple 
violations of EU fundamental rights. Nevertheless, political stakeholders are not 
willing to replace transatlantic bulk transfers with a more targeted mechanism, let 
alone to end the intelligence cooperation with the U.S. under SWIFT II altogether. 
Albeit the agreement was intended to remain in force until 2015 (art.23 para.2), 
the EU did not take the chance to re-enter into negotiations in order to tackle the 
weaknesses outlined in chapter 2.366 Instead, SWIFT II has been automatically 
extended year-on-year. If any SWIFT III was to come, it would establish a 
complementary cooperation on European financial data under an EU TFTS. Such a 
system is not a priori inaccordable with the rights to privacy and data protection, 
but has to meet the strict criteria established in CJEU case law. In fact, the Court 
has again demonstrated in its latest opinion on the EU Canada PNR Agreement that 
it does not shy back from taking on the role of a ‘co-legislator’; this will make 
negotiations with the U.S. even more challenging.367 Furthermore, an EU TFTS 
cannot be established on the basis of qualified majority voting but requires 
unanimity in the Council. 
 
Nevertheless, an EU TFTS and SWIFT III would not remedy the continuous violation 
of European fundamental rights inherent to SWIFT II. Despite the Lisbon Treaty 
having established CJEU jurisdiction in matters of the AFSJ (art.276 TFEU), SWIFT II 
is de facto immune due to the exceptional legal character of international 
agreements in EU law: 
 
Generally, the judicial review of international agreements is limited to the ex ante 
mechanism of art.218 para.9 TFEU. This procedure was used in case of the PNR 
Canada Agreement and is aimed at preventing the EU from entering international 
obligations contrary to EU internal standards as well as from damaging international 
relations. Evidently, the Court cannot be asked to give an opinion on SWIFT II after 
its entry into force in 2010. Nevertheless, even at the later stage of implementation, 
an international agreement can be scrutinised by the Court. According to arts.263f. 
TFEU, the Court can annul EU legislative acts and acts of the Council ex post if they 
fail to comply with primary law. Here, the acts of adoption as well as the Council’s 
                                                          
366 Apparently, the Article 29 Working Party was expecting a renewal: Letter from Isabelle 
Falque-Pierrotin to Rihards Kozlovskis (23 March 2015). 
367 By analogy: Hielke Hijmans, ‘PNR Agreement EU-Canada Scrutinised: CJEU Gives Very 
Precise Guidance to Negotiators’ (2017) 3 EDPL 406, 410. 
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negotiation mandate for the Commission could be subject to the Court’s 
jurisdiction. However, any action of annulment would be inadmissible due to the 
limited application period of two months from the publication of the agreement’s 
wording in 2010 (art.263 para.6).  
 
As pointed out before, action of annulment could also be filed against Europol’s 
monthly approvals (as well as the EDPS’ rejection of an individual complaint, 
respectively).368 Assuming that the Court could scrutinise the SWIFT II Agreement 
regarding its conformity with European fundamental rights (despite the principle of 
originator’s control), any decision of annulment would be limited to the impugned 
Europol decision but could not affect the validity of the agreement itself. In fact, 
if Europol was prevented from issuing any further approval, it would end the data 
transfer immediately but at the same time possibly constitute a breach of the 
agreement on behalf of the EU (art.21). The same applies to bans of processing 
issued by the EDPS in effectuation of the oversight competences in art.43 Europol 
Regulation. 
 
Therefore, art.265 TFEU might be an available option, basically imposing similar 
admissibility requirements as art. 263 paras.1 and 4 TFEU but focussing on the 
Commission’s failure to terminate the agreement according to art.21 para.2 or to 
renegotiate the cooperation under art.23 para.2. It could be argued here that the 
general discretion of the Commission regarding external action is reduced because 
of the severe infringements of arts.7 and 8 CFR resulting from the TFTP’s practice. 
Despite scholars suggested that the Court might be apprehensive to interfere with 
the Commission’s perorogative as to ‘political questions’,369 the EU Canada PNR 
opinion seems to prove the opposite.  
 
However, it appears unlikely that the Agreement could be suspended immediately 
on grounds of breach of contract on behalf of the UST (art.21 para.1) referring to 
the UST’s restrictive interpretation of individual rights; the EU was informed about 
this since the second Joint Review in 2014 and should have been aware of it well 
                                                          
368 According to art.263 para.5 TFEU in connection with art.47 Europol Regulation, 
administrative redress with the EDPS is to be exhausted before filing a case to the Court: 
cf. Möstl, supra no.347, 33 as to the former JSB. 
369 Elaine Fahey, ‘Challenging EU-US PNR and SWIFT law before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union’, in: Patryk Pawlak (ed), The EU-US Security and Justice Agenda in Action 
(ISS 2011), 55ff. 
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before because the UST Representations from 2007 already displayed the UST’s 
particular understanding of access and rectification rights. Consequently, 
respective claims would venire contra factum proprium. The Agreement still could 
be terminated according to art.21 para.2 requiring a notification of the U.S. six 
months in advance. In any case, however, data transferred to the U.S. so far could 
be further processed under the conditions of SWIFT II as stipulated in art.21 para.4 
thereof. 
 
Thus, the situation for affected individuals remains extremely unsatisfactory. If an 
EU TFTS/SWIFT III as described in chapter 3 could serve as an example of ‘best 
practice’, prompting the U.S. to adjust SWIFT II accordingly, is rather doubtful. 
Whilst it certainly would upgrade the EU as a counter-terrorism actor, its 
effectiveness in enhancing EU security is as uncertain as the TFTP’s. On the other 
hand, it would contribute to the growing Panopticon people in Europe are exposed 
to at the national and the European level. Therefore, as the EDPS pointed out 
repeatedly,370 the case still has to be demonstrated. 
  
                                                          
370 Supra no.287. 
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